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APPRAISALS OF LOSS AND DAMAGE
UNDER INSURANCE POLICIES
WESLEY A. STURGES* and WILLIAM W. STURGES**
fII
8. Enforcement of Appraisal Provisions.
1. General
2. Enforcement at Common Law (i.e., Non-statutory)-In Equity.
3. Enforcement at Common Law (i.e., Non-statutory)-By Action for
Damages.
4. Enforcement (Statutory)-By Remedies Provided In Standard Policy
Legislation.
Same-The Minnesota Situation.
Same-The Saba Ruling in Ohio and Minnesota Situation Cor-
pared.
Same-1955 Amendments of Minnesota Standard Policy Legislation.
5. Enforcement Under Arbitration Statutes.
6. Recommendations By the Law Revision Commission to the Legislature
To Amend New York Insurance Law.
1. General.
In thc earlier articles of this series relating to appraisal provisions in
fire insurance policies and in some other policies covering property loss,
attention was centered upon the following mattcrs-(1) the course of the
British and American courts and of state legislatures in making some of
*Ph.B., LL.B., J.D., LL.D., Professor of Law and Dean Emeritus, Yale Law School;
Visiting Professor of Law, University of Miami Law School; former Chairman of the
Board of Directors, American Arbitration Association.
*"Practicing attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina.
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those provisions irrevocable' and (2) the succeeding action of the American
courts in frustrating and displacing those irrevocable provisions.-'
This article embraces considerations of the more formal "enforce-
ability" of these irrevocable appraisal provisions. It covers both common
law, i.e., non-statutory) and statutory enforcement procedures or remedies.
"Enforcement" at common law (i.e., by non-statutory procedures) sug-
gests, of course, specific performancc of the provision by (1) plenary suit
brought to obtain a general injunctional order that the non-complying
party proceed with appraisal, (2) plenary suit to gain court appointment of
appraisers or an umpire as may be necessary to complete the appraisal
board and enable it to function as such;" also (3) an action for damages
against a party for his failure or refusal to do his part in compliance with
the intcndment of the provision.
"Enforcement" by statutory procedures involves the quest of like
objectives as those sought in "(1)" and "(2)" of the foregoing common
law rcmcdics by statutory motion.
2. Enforcement at Common Law (i.e., Non-Statutory)-In Equity
It should be observed at the outset that common law decisions ruling
irrevocability of some of these appraisal provisions brought "specific enforce-
iet''t" of those provisions in a very substantial respect. While the enforce-
ment is cffccted by the insurer duly pleading the provision to suspend or
stay the trial of the action brought by the insured to collect on the policy
and while the sustaining of the plea is in form a negative enforcement,
1. Sturges & Sturges, Apraisals of Loss and Damage Under Insurance Policies,
(3 pts.) (pt. I) Provisions For Appraisal of Loss and Damage, 1 NliAmi L. Q. 1
(1956).
The "irrevocability" here referred to is "irrevocability by action." The term
"revocability," as commonly applied to common law agreements for arbitration and
the like, has the two-fold reference (1) to the termination of tie agreement and
of the authority of all persons unider it by due notice thereof given by a party thereto
before award rendered; and (2) revocability by action, whereby a party is allowed to
sue in court in disregard of his agreement; the party defendant cannot effectively
plead the agreement to suspend or stay the action until arbitration is had, These
two specifications of common law revocability are frequently referred to as "revoca-
bility by notice" and "revocability by action," respectively.
'he making of some of the foregoing appraisal provisions "irrevocable" as
stated in the text, refers to the decisions of the courts ruling their irrevocability by
action. Although the decisions have not determined the precise question, it is con-
cluded that provisions held irrevocable by action would be held "irrevocable by notice"
-at least so long as they remain "irrevocable by action." Apparently the standard
appraisal provision enacted in the New York standard fire policy legislation (NN'. Ins.
LAW § 168) is now most prevalent iii American iurisdictions. See I I M[AMi L.Q. at
22 (1956).
2. StUrges & Sturges, Appraisals of Loss and l)aage Under Insurance Policies,
3 (pts.) (pt. 2). Irrevocable Appraisal Provisions-.Frustration and Displacement-
The Plethora of Waivers, 11 MIAMI L.Q. 323 (1957).
3. Sometimes one reads of "specific performance of appraisal contracts" when
the reference of the text is not confined to enforcement of the appraisal provision,
but, instead, concerns the "specific enforcement" of the container contract. See, e.g.,
note, 33 VA, L. REv. 494 (1947). Our present monograph is not concerned with ony''specific performance" of the container contract.
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still such suspension or stay of the trial of the cause in the court is a sub-
stantial enforcement of the provision for appraisal. True, the parties may
never go to appraisal, and the sustaining of the insurer's plea does not
order them to do so; yet, certain it is that the matter of disputed loss
will not be resolved otherwise than by appraisal so long as the ruling of
irrevocability stands.5
It also is deemed worthy to emphasize that, in considering further
instances of specific enforcement of these irrevocable appraisal provisions,
we part company with decisions and Judicial opinions denying enforcement
of provisions for arbitration which are subject to traditional common law
revocability. It has been declared from tinc to time tlat, as such provisions
are revocable at common law, by the same token courts of equity should
not decree specific performance of them either by a general order to proceed
or by appointing any arbitrator or umpire to complete an arbitral board
so that it can function. Reasons assigned for such rulings or opinions
generally include one to the effect that such agreements are revocable "at
law"; also that "equity" should not and will not undertake any decree
which may be frustrated or thwarted by revocation or otherwise., But in
4. Concerning the identity of the pleading at common law of the appraisal
provision-whether as being one in "abatement," or in "bar," or in "suspension"
or for "stay" of trial, see Sturges & Sturges, supra note 1, at 40-43.
5. Clearly enough, the pleading of the provision and the order of suspension
or stay of trial is "equitable" in nature even though it is sought and obtained in
the insured's action "at law" to collect on the insurance contract. Gatliff Coal Co.
v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1944). Compare Kolukundis Shipping Co. v.
Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d 978 at 987 (2d Cir. 1942). But see Sturges &
Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States
Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & CONTE:MP. PROn. 580 n. 43, 601-602 (1952).
6. Thus, in an early New York case, Greason v. Keteltas, 17 N. Y. 491,496
(1858), Selden, J., observed for the court of appeals that to grant specific per-
ormance "would bring such courts (i.e. courts of equit') in conflict with that policy
of the common law which permits parties in all cases to revoke a submission to
arbitration already made."
An "additional reason" was advanced "that it is against their policy (i.e. of
courts of equity) to make decrees which they cannot enforce. If the arbitrator be
named in the decree, this would violate the policy of the law as to the right of
revocation; and if not named, the decree could readily be evaded by choosing an
arbitrator who would refuse to act." See also note, 47 L.R.A. (n.s.) 364.
In his article, Specific Enforcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. PA.
L. REv. 160,161-164(1934-35) Professor Simpson concluded in line with the first
part of the foregoing opinion, that it is "a sound ground for the refusal of equity
specifically to enforce such contracts in view of their 'irrevocability' at law." (p. 164).
Indeed, he assigned "revocability at law" as being the only sound ground for the
refusal of equity to enforce such contracts, and discarded other suggestions such as
those set out by Selden, J., supra, as to what would be the futility of an equity
decree of specific enforcement. Thus, to quote Professor Simpson further: "It has
been said that if the court were to order the defendant to name an arbitrator,
it could not compel the execution of the decree; that even if the appointment of
arbitrators could be enforced, the arbitrators so appointed could not be compelled to
act as such or to agree; and that if the court were to appoint arbitrators, it would
'bind the parties contrary to their agreement,' None of these grounds seems sufficient.
The ordinary processes of a court of equity will be adequate in the usual case to
compel the defendant to appoint an arbitrator; if the arbitrator so appointed refuses
to act (and to act in good faith), the court can compel the defendant to appoint
another; and, moreover, there would seem to be no objection to an appointment by
the court where the defendant has refused to appoint in accordance with his agree-
1958]
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ment, since it may well be said that he must be taken to have waived his right of
selection." (p. 161.)
Professor Simpson also took the position that if the common law rule of
revocability were overcome, specific enforcement should follow. "Granted a change
in the common law rule," he said, "there is nothing (except the numbing effect of
precedent) to prevent equity from enforcing specific performance of arbitration agree-
ments on the ground of inadequacy of the legal remedy for the breach thereof, subject,
of course, to the exercise of the chancellor's judicial discretion in accordance with the
principles applied in other specific performance cases." (p. 164,)
On the other hand, Professor Hayes, in his article, Specific Performance of
Contracts for Arbitration or Valuation, 1 CORNELL L.Q. 225 (1916), found that two
"main reasons" had been assigned by the British and American courts for denying
specific performance of arbitration agreements, namely: "(1) The inability of the
court of equity to fully execute any decree which it might make for specific perform-
ance of such an agreement. It is powerless to compel a party to perform the dis-
cretionary act of choosing an arbitrator or valuer, or to require such person to act
when chosen. This is simply one application of the rile that equity cannot make a
decree requiring the perfornmance of personal acts calling for the exercise of skill or
discretion. (2) The unwillingness of the court to aid in holding parties to an agree-
ment, the object of which is to exchtde the detemination of controversies by the
judicial tribunals." (P. 225.) According to Professor ilayes the first rule "seems to
be the more persuasive," especially when ielated to the special processes of equity in
determining whether or not to grant specific performance. Still the second view also
must be honored bccause; "If the contract calls for the arbitration of controversies
which by the law of a particular jurisdiction cannot be lawfully withdrawn from the
cognizance of the cotrts, the contract may well be held invalid both at law and in
equity." (Emphasis added.) (P. 225)
Apparently both Professor Simpson and Professor Ilayes deemed it well con-
eluded that "equity" should consider that it should follow "the law" as to revocability
of common law arbitration agreements, and, by the same token, that specific enforce-
ment of such agreements should not be expected.
This doctrine of subservience of "equity" to 'law" does not ring true. One
necessarily recalls the "splendid instances," in the history of our jurisprudence "of the
triumph of equitable principles over technical rules." 4 KmsN'r, CoM,,IENr'AitES 158. See
also in this connection Electrical Research Prod., Inc. v. Vitaphone Corp., 20 Del. Ch.
417, 171 Atl. 738 (1934); Ellington v. Currie, 193 N. C. 610, 137 S.E. 869 (1927).
The opinion by justice Story in Tobey v. County of Bristol, 23 Fed. Gas.
1313 (No. 14065) (C.C.I). Mass. 1845) advanced further thought on this question
of specific performance of arbitration agrecients. lie presented the view, in addition
to those cited above, that equity should not specifically enforce arbitration agreements
because of designated frailties of common law arbitration tribunals. "Now we all
know," lie declared, "that arbitrators at the common law possess no authority what-
soever, even to administer an oath, or to compel the attendance of witnesses. They
cannot compel the production of documents and papers and books of account, or
insist upon a discovery of facts from the parties tinder oath. They are not ordinarily
well enough acquainted with the principles of law or equity, to administer either
effectually. Ought then a court of equity to compel a resort to such a tribunal, by
which, however honest and intelligent, it can in no case be clear that the real legal
or equitable rights of the parties can be fully ascertained or perfectly protected?"
(Emphasis added.) (P. 1321.)
Whether or not Story, J., would have entertained like reactions toward irre-
vocable provisions for appraisal of loss under insurance policies is unknown. But even
as entertained with respect to agreements for arbitration they do not seem very per-
suasive. Professor Simpson was not persuaded. lie observed as follows: "More substan-
tial, perhaps, is the argument that, since lay arbitration tribunals do not have the
facilities for investigation nor the knowledge of applicable legal principles which the
courts possess, a court of equity should not compel a party to submit the determination
of his rights to such a tribunal. In reply to this argument it may be said: (1) This
is just what the parties have agreed to do, and, unless there exists some public policy
against extraimdicial settlement of controversies, that agreement should be respected
and enforced." lie also cited the fact that statutes in sonic iurisdictions provide for
the procurement of witnesses and evidence in common law arbitrations. (P. 161).
justice Story's rationale of refusing specific enforcement because of appre-
hension that common law arbitration tribunals cannot make sure "that the real legal
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the case of irrevocable appraisal provisioris, any rationale predicated on
revocability for denying specific enforcement is obviously misconceived.
Furthermore, the appraisal provision being irrevocable, it is manifest
that unless the insured can gain an appraisal (or unless a "waiver" is worked
against the insurer at some point along the way) the insured may have no
recovery on his policy? The substantial and specific enforcement accorded
the insurer by duly pleading the provision makes sufficient setting for the
insured's claim to a mutuality of remedy. And it seems difficult to conceive
a situation constituting more fully the "inadequate remedy at law" for the
insured traditionally said to inspire equity to act.8
or equitable rights of the parties can be fully ascertained or perfectly protected" mis-
judged the common law tradition that common law arbitration pursuant to the parties'
agreement therefor contemplates no such assurance. In other words, unless the parties
agree otherwise, it is the intent of the common law arbitration that the arbitrators
shall decide on the evidence presented to them in accord with the parties' right of
hearing what they think ought to be-ie, what, if anything is "justly due" by the
one party to the other. See, for example, White Star Mining Co. v. Hultberg, 220
Ill. 578, 601, 77 N.E. 327, 335 (1906); King v. The Falls of Neuse Mfg. Co., 79
N.C. 360 (1878); Mickles v. Thayer, 14 Allen. 114 (Mass. 1867). And, judging
by the reported cases, rarely indeed have the parties stipulated that the arbitrator
should follow the law. In Borchell v. Marsh, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 344, 349 (1854)
the Supreme Court of the United States observed as follows: "Arbitrators are judges
chosen by the parties to decide the matters submitted to them, finally and without
appeal. As a mode of settling disputes it should receive every encouragement from
courts of equity. If the award is within the submission, and contains the honest deci-
sion of the arbitrators, after a full and fair hearing of the parties, a court of equity
will not set it aside for error either of law or fact. A contrary course would be a substi-
tution of the judgment of the chancellor in place of the judges chosen by the parties.
and would make an award the cormencement, not the end, of litigation." (Em-
phasis added.)
Justice Story's notation of alleged frailties of common law arbitration tribunals
in that they want power to administer oaths and to compel the attendance of
witnesses and the production of evidence seems never to have counted as any cause
to defeat an award rendered by common law arbitrators, Indeed, the want of these
powers seems never to have been presented for judicial consideration as a cause to
defeat any common law award. And it is concluded that the want of these powers
has rarely, if ever, assumed substantial concern to a party to a common law arbitration.
Judging by the reported cases, rarely does it appear that the parties deemed it expedient
to stipulate that the arbitrator or witnesses be sworn. Of course, on the other hand,
nobody knows how many parties have declined common law arbitration because of
these frailties. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's foregoing admonition that common
law arbitration "should receive every encouragement from courts of equity" made no
exception on account of these alleged frailties.
7. If the insurer neglects or refises to appoint an appraiser, or to do its part
otherwise to bring on the appraisal, it will be ruled to have waived the right of
appraisal. See Sturges & Sturges, supra note 2, at 341. But, of course, this does not
help the insured along to an appraisal.
8. Perhaps it should be added that want of precedent should be no effective
deterent to the granting of equitable relief in such cases. "A lack of precedent, or
mere novelty in incident, is no obstacle to the award of equitable relief, if the case
presented is referable to an established head of equity jurisprudence-either of primary
right or of remedy merely." Hardy v. Bankers Trust Co. of N. Y., 137 N.J. Eq. 352,
44 A.2d 839 (1945). See also circuit Judge Brown (dissenting) in Lincoln Mills
v. Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81 at 89-96 (5th Cir. 1956), and Stone, J., in
Park Constr. Co. v. Independent School Dist., 209 Minn. 182, 296 N.V. 475 (1941);
Palma v. Watson Surplus Lines Agency, 307 P.2d 689 (Calif. Dist. Ct. App. 1957)
reviewed infra note 17.
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Moreover, when the provision is enforceable in one respect in the
namc of irrevocability, why should it not be enforceable by plenary suit
looking either to a general injunctional order to proceed or to court appoint-
ment of an appraiser or umpire, or both, against either party that neglects
or refuses to perform his part of the appraisal provision? Current practice
under modern arbitration statutes verifies that such suits and orders are
feasible. Under these statutes applications (motions) by one party to an
arbitration agreement against the other will bring injunctional orders to
proceed with arbitration and court appointment of arbitrators to fill any
vacancy in the arbitral board. It is clear, moreover, that those proceedings
and orders are understood to be part and parcel of traditional equity
iurisdiction.'0
Accordingly, it is difficult to appreciate either the ruling (or the
rationale therefor) in Iappy Hank Auction Co. v. Eagle Fire Ins.
Co." decided by the New York Court of Appeals in 1956. Insured de-
manded appraisal; insurers refused; insurers also denied liability on the
policies. Insured sued to obtain a general order against insurers to proceed
with appraisal. The petition was denied. "Despitc the mandatory language
of the standard policy," said the court of appeals, "the Ncw York courts
have no power to require an insurer to take part in an appraisal demanded
by an insured but refused by his insurer."12 The court took note of what
9. Instances are wanting of an impasse or of requirements of supervision accru-
ing in carrying out the order which seem to have embarrassed the court ordering the
enforcement. See e.g., cases cited note 10 infra, see also Lincoln Mills of Ala. v.
Textile Workers Union, 230 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1956), as reversed, 353 U.S. 448
1957); In the matter of Gantt, liurtado & Cia, 397 N.Y. 433, 79 N.E.2d 815
1948); Western Union Tel. Co. v. American Communications Ass'n. C.I.O., 295
N.Y. 395, 68 N.E.2d 183 (1946); Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Mfg. Co., 252 N.Y.
284, 169 N.E. 386 (1929); In re Amitorg Trading Corp., 277 App. Div. 531, 100
N.Y.S.2d 747 (1950); Nippon-Ki-Ito Kaisha, Ltd. v. Ewing-Thomas Corp., 313 Pa.
442, 170 At, 286 (1934). Also note, 46 COL. L. REv. 845, 847 n. 11 (1946). Also
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Textile Workers v.
American Thread Co., 113 F. Supp. 137 (D. Mass. 1953).
10. Shanferoke Co. v. Westchester Co., 293 U.S. 449 (1935); Reconstruction
Fin. Corp. v. Ilarrisons & Crosfield, 204 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1953); Gatliff Coal Co.
v. Cox, 142 Fed. 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1944); Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Co., 29
In re Feuer Transp., 295 N.Y. 87, 65 N.E.2d 178 (1946); Finsilver, Still & Moss v.
Goldberg & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 171 N.E. 579 (1930); Matter of Lipschutz, 304 N.Y.
58, 106 N.E.2d 8 (1952). See also Sturges & Murphy, suora note 5, at 601-602, n. 43,
and Jones, The Nature of the Court's Jurisdiction In Statutory Post-Award iMotions, 46
CAr.. L. REV. 41I (1958).
Ii. 1 N.Y. 2d 534, 136 N.E.2d 842 (1956).
12. Even more dubious is the ruling of the Alabama court that the courts will
not restrain one party (the insured in the given case) from interfering with the
appraisers and preventing them from carnying on the appraisal. Ex parte Birmingham
Fire Ins. Co., 233 Ala. 370, 172 So. 99 (1937). It is suspected that this court was
influenced to its decision by assuming that its alleged equity rule of denying specific
enforcement of revocable common law arbitration agreements was applicable to the
irrevocable appraisal provision before the court. Said the court: "The courts are
almost unanimous that equity will not decree specific performance of a contract to
submit a course to arbitration." As is pointed out above, the rationale for this alleged
near-unanimity is not significant in connection with a consideration of the specific
enforcement of irrevocable appraisal provisions.
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it conceded to be a contrary ruling in Ohio. Said the court: "There is a
contrary rule in Ohio, Saba v. Homeland Ins. Co., 159 Ohio St. 237,
112 N.E.2d 1, 44 A.L.R. 841, but this court is so far committed on the
question that remedial action must come from the Legislature, if at all."
(Emphasis added.) The court cited no authorities whereby it became so
committed.13
In Saba v. Homeland Ins. Co.,'" the insured moved the Ohio
Court of Probate to appoint an "umpire." The court did so. The supreme
court sustained the action (as had the court of appeals below).
The insured and insurers failed to agree upon the amount of loss
and damage; the insured duly designated his appraiser; the insurers refused
his demand to select an appraiser. The "umpire" appointed by the court
and the appraiser selected by the insured did an appraisal and returned
their award. This appeal concerned only the validity of the appointment
of the "umpire." 15
The policies contained the New York type of standard appraisal pro-
vision providing that upon failure of the parties to agree upon the amount
of loss, "each shall select an appraiser" and the two "shall first select" an
"umpire"; and if the two fail to select an umpire for a period stated "then
on the request of the insured or this company, such umpire shall be
selected by a judge of a court of record."
The majority opinion' " by Chief Justice '\eygandt took account of
the foregoing language of the appraisal provision to point out that either
party (insured as well as insurer) is entitled to demand that the other
select an appraiser and that each party (insurer as well as insured) shall
select an appraiser. "Hence," said the court "unless these words are held
to signify the exact opposite of their obvious meaning, the appraisers must
be selected when demanded by the insured or by the insurer."
The court gave principal attention to defendants' contention that
when they refused to select an appraiser, the insured had no other recourse
than that of suing to collect on the policies. The court rejected this con-
13. The court below [286 App. Div. 505, 145 N.Y.S.2d 206 (1955)) relied upon
Matter of Delmar Box Co., 309 N.Y. 60, 127 N.E.2d 808 (1955). "The first cause
of action," said the court, "which prays for a direction requiring the companies to
determine the amount of the loss by appraisal, pursuant to the policy provisions,
must he dismissed on the authority of Matter of Delmar Box Co., 309 N.Y. 60, 127
N.E.2d 808." This case is reviewed in notes intra. It is difficult to appreciate its
relevancy to the foregoing ruling in the Happy flank Auction Co. case.
14. 159 Ohio St. 237, 112 N.E.2d 1 (1953).
15. An action brought by the insured to collect the award had been removed
to a United States District Court.
16. Two of the seven iudges dissented and each rendered a separate opinion.
Matthias, J., (dissenting) commented that "diligence of counsel has failed to disclose
a decision of any court of last resort on the question clearly presented in the instant
case." Hart, J., (dissenting) said that he had made a search of the authorities "and
is unable to find any case in which the procedure adopted in this case, namely, the
appointment of an umpire before the two appraisers were appointed, has been attempted
or remotely followed."
1958)
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tention on the ground that the insured by paying his premiums for the
policy had bought and paid for the right to appraisal as set out in the
appraisal provision; that it was a valuable right; and he should have the
enforcement which the probate court granted. Said the court:
This [defendants' contention] is equivalent to telling the plain-
tiff that, although he paid a premium for policies containing the
advantage of the appraisal provisions, lie in fact received nothing
therefor, and that the sole result of the insertion of the appraisal
provisions in the policies was that the defendants gave themselves
the advantageous right to compel the plaintiff to select an appraiser
before lie could sue on the policies. Hence, under this theory the
appraisal provisions were a detriment instead of a benefit to the
plaintiff, inasmuch as even without the appraisal provisions he, of
course, had the right to sue. The plaintiff was led to believe that
he was purchasing policies giving him the right to an appraisal
and a prompt settlement of his loss so lie would have the insur-
ance nionev with which to reconstruct his building without the
expense and delay incident to litigation. Obviously this is a valuable
right which lie should not be denied.
Apparently in order to meet an argument by the insurers that there
was no authority in the appraisal provision for any court to appoint an
'umpire" when only one of the two appraisers had been selected, the
chief justice took this position:
The failure and refusal of the defendants to select an appraiser
as required by the provisions of the policies constituted a failure
to agree on an umpire just as effectively as if they had selected
an appraiser and instructed him not to agree on an umpire. Under
these circumstances the plaintiff was authorized to request the
court to select such impire.
The chief justice concluded:
Like the lower courts, this court can discover no reason for
holding the plaintiff to the agreement but excusing the defendants
from their obligations under the plain, inescapable language they
theniselves chose to use when they sold the policies to the
plaintiff. 7
17. Matthias J., seemed to base his dissent upon the ground that, notwithstanding
the mandatory language of the appraisal provision relied upon by the chief justice,
the court below just could not do what it had done for the insured under the pro-
vision; that the provision bound the insured but not the insurer.
Hart I., contended that the remedy as accorded the insured by the majority
was not "legally available to him." After considerable review of seemingly remote
propositions re common law arbitration agreements it was concluded that "there was
no authority whatever for the appointment of an umpire until each party had appointed
his or its appraiser. These two were first charged with the appointment of the umpire,"
also that "the insurer's failure to appoint an appraiser will not warrant a court in
appointing an umpire to act solely with the appraiser appointed by the insured." (In
this connection the judge relied upon National Fire Ins. Co. v. Shuman, 44 Ga. App.
819; 163 S.S. 306 (1932) reviewed in notes infra. Compare the Minesota cases reviewed
infra.
In Palma v. Watson Surplus Lines Agency, 148 Cal. App. 2d 879, 307 P.2d
689 (1957) the trial judge, in a declaratory judgment proceeding, ordered insurers to
[VOL. XIII
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It seems quite clear that the chief justice and majority of the court
in the Saba case gave much more careful consideration to the question
at hand than appears in connection with the unanimous action of the
New York Court of Appeals in the Happy I-lank Auction Co. case. The
unanimity in the Ohio Saba case of the trial court, the intermediate court
and supreme court majority in finding good reason for enforcing the
provision and in finding no substantial reason for not doing so is im-
pressive. The Saba decision gives a new judicial leadership within traditional
equity jurisdiction in the judicial enforcement of these irrevocable appraisal
provisions.
3. Enforcement at Common Law (i.e., Non-Statutory)-
By Action for Damages.
No American decision has been discovered determining whether or
not an action for damages will lie for breach of one of these irrevocable
appraisal provisions.'8 Speculation upon the feasibility of having any such
indirect enforcement probably should be reckoned of little practical value.'5
select an appraiser on condition that if they neglected to do so for 10 days he (the
judge) would make the appraisal after hearing the parties. The insurers did not
select an appraiser during the time; the judge, after such hearing, made the"appraisal." The judge's award was sustained; and it was sustained although the judge
did not comply with the appraisal provision, at least as to its requirement of item-
ization, Referring to the Saba case, the court commented "In the Saba case the court
appointed an umpire to work with the appraiser appointed by the insured. In the
instant case the court substituted itself for both the appraisers and the umpire. Either
procedure was proper, under the general equity sowers of the court." (Emphasis
added.)
Concerning the itemization prescribed in the provision which was held not
applicable to the judge's appraisal and award, the court observed as follows: "A trial
court generally is not required to make minute evidentiary findings, and no reason
exists why such court, when making an appraisal, should depart from customary pro-
cedures. Because the insurers have made it necessary to adopt a substitute procedure,
they must accept it with its burdens as well as its benefits."
18. It has been stated that "it is recognized that the non-breaching party may
institute an action for damages for the breach of the agreement." 44 A.L.R.2d 851
1935). See also Hart, J., dissenting in the Saba case, citing annot., 47 L.R.A. (n.s.)
09,410. None of the authorities cited seems so to decide.
19. It is difficult to imagine just how a cause of action for damages might be
deemed to accrue to either the insured or insurer in connection with these irrevocable
appraisal provisions.
Clearly the insurer is provileged to invoke the provision (i.e., plead it to defeat
insurer's action to collect on the policy); it would incur no liability as for breach of
the appraisal provision or insurance policy in so doing and, equally obvious, it seems,
the insurer should incur no liability for waiving the provision and right to appraisal.
It also seems that the insured should not be held in damages for bringing
his action in disregard of the provision to collect on the policy. This is true because
under the present posture of the law of the cases on irrevocability by action the
efficacy and validity of the plea of the provision is not finally determined until the
adjudication of no "waiver" by the insurer. The action by the insured looks to a
declaratory judgment of either "waiver" or continuing vitality of the provision. Pro-
tanto, it seems the insured is privileged to sue. Conceivably, of course, when there
is the adjudication of no "waiver" the insured could be made liable in damages for
wrong done the insurers by initiating the action-but with wlat justice is not apparent.
It seems that a situation would not occur like that wherein a party to a
general arbitration provision at common law revokes by instituting an action or by
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Of course, under the view as advanced b the inajority in the Saba case
that the insured and insurer bear mutual obligations to go forward with
aii appraisal, conceivably a cause of action for damages might be accorded
to the one party against the other when predicated upon the defendant's
neglect or refusal to select an appraiser. It is not readily conceived, how-
ever, what might be a practical measure of damages-especially when the
provision is ruled specifically enforceable as in the Saba case.
4. Enforcement (Statutory)-By Remedies Provided In Standard
Policy Legislation.
Standard policy legislation gives only very limited enforcement of the
appraisal provision.
Thus, the New York standard fire policy and appraisal provision
-2 0
make no pretense of enabling either party (insured or insurer) to obtain
in any court a general order against the other to proceed with an appraisal.
Nor do they make any pretense of enabling either party to gain court
appointment of an appraiser upon the failure or refusal of the other
party to make his selection pursuant to the provision. Thc only remedy
looking to any such enforcement of the appraisal relates to the selection
of the "umpire."
The current New York provision reads that each party (insured and
insurer) shall select an appraiser; then, the appraisers so selected "shall
first select" an "umpire." Upon the appraisers "failing for fifteen days2'
to agree upon such umpire, then, on request of the insured or this com-
pany, such umpire shall be selected by a judge of the court of record in
notice, or refuses to do his part notwithstanding explicit stipulation to select arbitrators
or otherwise abide by the agreement. That the bringing of actions for damages by the
aggrieved party for such treatment of revocable common law arbitration provisions
bring little financial reward, see Livingston v. Rollin, 5 El. & B1. 131 (1955); Mun-
son v. Straits of Dover S.S, Co., 9 Fed. 787 (D. N.Y. 1900); Cocalis v. Eugene
Nazlides, 308 111. 152, 139 N.E. 95 (1923).
20. N.Y. INS. LAW. § 168. Sec also § 173.
21. Concerning the computation of this fifteen day period (from when to when)
see Cady Land Co. v. Philadelphia F. & M. Ins. Co., 195 'Wis. 509, 218 N.W. 814
(1928); National Fire Ins. Co. v. Shuman, infra note 23.
That the Judge's jurisdiction to appoint the umpire is limited to the situation
wherein the appraisers have failed or neglected to select one for the fifteen day period,
see Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n. v. Cahill, 266 Ky. 362, 98 S.W.2d 462 (1936). See
also In re 176 and 178 East Main Street, Amsterdam, N. Y.. 263 N.Y. 197, 188
N.E. 647 (1934) (judge appointed umpire on application of insured; this, after
appraisers had selected an umpire and an award had been returned by insurer's
appraiser and the umpire. Insured sought in his application to the judge for appoint-
ment of the umpire to challenge the insurer's appraiser for alleged fraud in inducing
insured's appraiser to agree upon the umpire, Held, this challenge could be made only
by action to set aside the award.)
Concerning the power of appraisers to make a second selection of an umpire
see Alliance Ins. Co. v. Williamson, 36 Ga. App. 497, 137 S.E. 277 (1927).
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the state iii which the property insured is located."2 2 The provision then
goes on to indicate, in unnecessary ambiguity, the respective roles of the
appraisers and the umpire, as follows: "The appraisers shall then appraise
the loss . . . , stating separately sound value and loss . . . to each item,
and failing to agree shall submit their differenrces only to the umpire. Al
award in writing so itemized of any two, when filed with this company,
shall detemine the amount of sound value and loss ... " (Emphasis
added.)
Prior to the foregoing decision in the Saba case it had been held by
a lower court in Georgia (with a syllabus opinion) under similar legislation,
that the judge was not thereby authorized to select the "umpire" to serve
as an appraiser or otherwise, although the insurer had refused to select an
aippraiscr. The opinion of the court indicates no serious consideration of
what should be deemed the intent of the contract in the light of the
insurer's refusal to select an appraiser such as the Ohio court undertook
in the Saba case. It was held that the legislation mthorizcd court selection
of an umpire only after (1) insured anid insurer had each selected an
appraiser and (2) the two so selected had failcd for the stated period of
time to select an umpire. Said the opinion:
The mere failure of the insurance company to select an appraiser
does not warrant the appointment of an umpire to act solely with
the appraiser appointed by the insured. It follows that, where the
insurer has selected no appraiser and has not otherwise participated
in or consented to an appraisement, a finding or report on the loss,
made by an appraiser selected by the insured and an umpire
appointed by the court, is not binding upon the insurer.
23
\Vhy this legislation of so limited scope as to these remedies has
been continucd is not ven clear. Having required the use of the irrevocable
appraisal provision by its standard policy legislation is it not clear why
the legislature has left it so one-sided. If court appointment of the
"umpire" when the two appraisers fail to select him is expedient, why
not court appointment also of an appraiser when either party neglects or
refuses to select one? If court appointment of any personnel to the
appraisal board is feasible, why not a court order against the recalcitrant
22. That notice of the application to the adverse parts is required, see Cale-
donian Ins. Co. v. The Superior Court, 140 Cal. App. 2d 458, 295 P.2d 49 (1956);
Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n. v. Cahill, 266 Ky. 362, 98 S.W.2d 462 (1936).
Compare Palatine Ins. Co. v. Gilleland, 79 Ga. App. 18. 52 S.E.2d 537
(1949); Ozburn v. National Union Fire Ins. Co., 45 Ga. App. 33, 163 S.E. 321
(1932); Philadelphia Underwriters '. Folds, 156 Ga. 773, 120 S.E. 102 (1923).
23. National Fire Ins. Co. v. Shuman. 44 Ca. App. 819, 163 S.E. 306 (1932).
See also O'Rourke v. German Ins. Co., 96 Minn. 154, 104 NV. 900 (1905).
But see the subsequent Minnesota view, infra, pp. 14-15.
Compare the subsequent decision in Palatine Ins. Co. v. Gilleland, 79 Ga.
App. 18, 52 S.E.2d 537 (1949) (Insured and insurer each appointed an appraiser;
after these appraisers failed to agree upon the "umpire" for the fifteen days, the judge
appointed an "umpire"; insurer's appointee as appraiser refused to convene with the
other two for an appraisal and the insurer declared that it would have no more to do
with an appraisal. Appraisal and award by insured's appointee and the "umpire"
appointed by the court were sustained).
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party whenever ]e neglects or refuses in any other respect duly to perform
his part to bring on the appraisal?
Saine-The Minnesota Situation.
The Minnesota standard policy legislatiou relating to appraisals of
loss under fire policies varies considerably from the foregoing New York
law. Most of the cases relating to the questions at hand were concerned
with this legislation as it was enacted in 1923. It was amended in 1955
as indicated below. In 1923 it providecd that when the insured and insurer
failed to agree upon the loss "the amount of such loss shall be ascertained
by two competent appraisers the insured and this conpany each selecting
one" within fifteen days after a statement of loss had been rendered by
the insured to the company, and, if either party failed to select an appraiser
within that time, "the other appraiser and the umpire sclccted as herein
provided nmay act as a board of appraisers, and whatever award they shall
find shall be as binding as though the two appraisers had been chosen.' '4
Then followed a provision for selection of the "umpire," namely, "the two
[appraisers shall first select" the "uimpire"; "provided that if after five
days the two appraisers cannot agree on such an umpire, '- 5 the presiding
24. Under the Minnesota view the parties are entitled to be heard in these
appraisals, Dufresne v. Marine Ins. Co., 157 Minn. 390, 196 N.W. 560 (1923);
American Cent. Ins. Co. v. District Court. 125 Minn. 374, 174 N.NV. 242 (1914).
An ex parte appraisal and award by the appraiser selected by the one party and the
umpire appointed by the judge after due notice of the appraisal have been sustained.
Itasca Paper Co. v. Niagara Fire fis. Co., 175 Minn. 73, 220 NV. 425 (1928);
Abranmovitz v. Continental Ins. Co., 170 Minn. 215, 212 N.W. 449 (1927). See
also Orient Ins. Co. v. Skillet Co., 28 F'2d 968 (8th Cir. 1928); Glidden Co. v.
Retail Hardware Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 181 Minn. 518, 233 NAV. 310 (1930); Astell
v. American Cent. Ilis. Co., 114 Minn. 206, 130 N.W. 1002 (1911).
It has also been ruled that the insured may gain appointment of the "umpire"
to serve with his appointee as appraiser in earnying out the appraisal and rendering an
award even though the insurer denies liability on the policy. Such denial does not
defeat insured's right to appraisal. Abramowitz v. Continental Ins. Co., supra; Itasca
Paper Co. v. Niagara Fire Ins. Co., supra; Orient Ins. Co. v. Skillet Co., sura; and
see Sturges & Sturges, supra note 2, at 341.
25. Unless the appraisers named the umpire within the five days, the judge, it
has been held, was authorized to do so On application-and this was true "regardless
of whether the inability [of the appraisers to name onel is due to failure to agree
after attempting to do so or to failure to attempt to agree at all." Kavli v. Eagle
Star Ins. Co., 206 Minn. 360, 288 N.W. 723 (1939).
It also has been held adequate that the appraisers agree orally upon the
umpire; they need not name him by any writing. Astell v. American Cent. Ins. Co.,
114 M iun. 206, 130 NW. 1002 (1911). It also seems clear that they may effectively
name one without any prior disagreement as to who should be named-and before
expiration of the five days. See Gonin v. Northwestern Nat. Ilis. Co., 145 Wash.
199, 259 Pac. 387 (1927); Chandos v. American Fire is. Co. of Philadelphia, 84
Wis. 184, 54 N.W. 390 (1893).
Appointment by the judge of the umpire before the parties had disagreed
over the amount of loss was held premature and invalid; also that there could be no
disagreement over the amount of loss until the statement of loss had been submitted
by insured to insurer and the fifteen days thereafter had elapsed. "The appointment of
the umpire prior to the rendition of the statement of the insured to the insurer and
the expiration of the fifteen days thereafter within which either party may demand
appraisement is premature and void." Boston Ins. Co. v. A, 1H. Jacobson Co., 226
Minn. 479, 33 N.W.2d 602 (1948).
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judge26 of the district court of the county wherein the loss occurs may
appoint such an umpire upon application of either party."
27
The Minnesota Supreme Court first ruled upon this legislation con-
cerning the appointment of the umpire by the judge in Abromowitz v.
Continental Ins. Co., 28 as follows:
It [the statute] means that, in case either party fails to select an
appraiser, the other may have an umpire appointed in the manner
provided in case two appraisers fail to agree upon one. The statute
has been so amended since the decision in O'Rourke v. German
Insurance Co. of Freeport, 96 Minn. 154, 104 N.W. 900, as to
make inapplicable the comment there made that the statute 'has
no application to a case where a referee nominated by one of the
parties refuses to act as such; for the court is only authorized to
appoint a third referee.' Since that time and by chapter 421, G.L.
1913, there has been put into the statute the provision for the
selection of an umpire and an award, even though one party does
not nominate an appraiser.
Same-The Saba Riding in Ohio and Minnesota Situation Compared.
Clearly enough the chief justice and majority of the Ohio court
in the foregoing Saba case took liberties with the text of the provision
relating to the appraisal hoard as set down in the New York standard
appraisal provision. But the awkwardness of the text in this connection
invited, indeed required, judicial aid ("construction") to resolve various
ambiguities especially as to the respective roles of the appraisers and the
umpire. According to the appraisal provision as indicated above if the
insured and insurer fail to agree upon the amount of loss each party "shall
select" an "appraiser" then, these appraisers "shall first select" an umpire;
then the appraisers are to "appraise the loss stating separately actual cash
value and loss to each item: and, failing to agree, shall submit "their
differences only" to the unpirc. On the other hand, "an award in writing
of any two" shall determine the amount.
The "umpire" appointed by the Ohio court was not, of course, selected
by the two appraisers; the loss was never appraised by the two appraisers;
nor did such appraisers ever fail to agree upon an umpire; nor was the
"umpire," as appointed by the court, to decide "differences only" arising
between the two appraisers. There was an award in writing of two-but
not "of any two" according to the text.
Under the forcgoing Minnesota standard policy legislation of 1923,
it was provided that when the insured and insurer failed to agrce upon
26. The Maine and Massachusetts standard policy legislation differ, from that
of New York and Minnesota by providing that the appointnent is to be made by the
insurance commissioner. See Sturges & Stnrges, supra note 2, at 363.
27. The statute of 1923 is set out in Abramowitz v. Continental Ins. Co., 170
Minn. 215, 212 N.W. 449 (1927).
28. See note 24 supra.
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the amount of loss "the amount of such loss shall be ascertained by- two
competent appraisers, the insured and this company each selecting one."
If all went well with this selection of the two appraisers, they should "first
select" the umpire. As distinguished from the New York provision it was
not declared that the submission to the umpire by the appraisers should be
of "their differences only," (they were, however, to submit to him "their
differences"). Furthermore the Minnesota legislation expressly provided
(while that of New York did not) that if a party failed to select his
appraiser within the stated time the appraiser selected by the other party
and umpire appointed by the judge "may act as a board of appraisers"
and that their award should be "as binding as though the two appraisers
had bccn chosen." In other words, in such a case under the Minnesota
provision the one appraiscr and "uimpire" were to act as "alpraisers"-
with no "umpirc."
In short, the Ohio court in the Saba case accomplished under the
New York appraisal provision what was provided in the Minnesota statute
and ruled by the Minnesota court, namely, the translation of the "umpire"
appointed by the judge into an "appraiser" for the purpose of the given
appraisal and award. Under both views the "umpire" appointed by the
judge in case of default of a party in selecting an appraiser is not the
''umpire" contemplated when all goes well to the point that the two
appraisers are appointed and Ihey duly name the "umpire"; nor is the
"umpire" appointed in case of such default the one contemplated when
the two appraisers appointed by the parties fail to agree upon the "umpire"
and the judge appoints the "umpire."
More significant, perhaps, is the following frailty of the appraisal
hoard derived by following the foregoing Ohio and Minnesota rulings:
If the single "appraiser" and "umpire" fail to agree upon an award and
all of the constituent details going to its make-up their endeavors may come
to aiught. In short, the appraisal and award are contingent upon these two
persons being in accord throughout.2"
Same-J955 Amnendments of Minnesota Standard Policy Legislation.
It 1955 the Minnesota Legislature revised its standard policy legislation,
including substantial amendmrent of the appraisal provision." By these
revisions if the parties fail to agree upon the amount of loss, then, "on
the written deand of either, each shall select a competent and disinterested
appraiser. If either party fails to select an appraiser within twenty days of
29. Unanimity there was, as it happened, in the Saba case, supra note 14 and
in the Minnesota cases, supra note 24.
30. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 65.011 (1953).
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the demand,3 ' then a presiding judge of the district court of the county
wherein the loss occurs may appoint such apprais'er for such party upon
application therefor by the other party and five days notice in writing.
Then the two appraisers "shall first select a competent and disinterested
umpire." If they fail for fifteen days to agree upon an umpire, the judge,
upon application of a party may, after five days notice in writing, appoint.
Whereupon, the appraisers shall appraise the loss, "and, failing to agree,
shall submit their differences, only, to the umpire." An award, duly itemized,
"of any two" when filed with the insurer shall determine tile amount.
In short, the judge is to appoint an appraiser when a party fails to
appoint one; and lie is to appoint an "umpire' if the two appraisers fail
to agree upon one.' 2 The umpire, in any case is to decide "differences only"
arising between the appraisers,-but, as the text has it an award "of any
two" shall determine the amount. No other standard policy legislation has
been discovered in the American jurisdictions going so far to assure an
appraisal. Clearly it is superior to the provision for appointment of an
umpire (only) as under the New York statute, and overcomes the significant
frailty pointed out above with respect to both the earlier (1923) Minnesota
legislation and the situation under the ruling of the Ohio court in the Saba
case, namely, of leaving the appraisal and award to the hazard of the
appraiser and "umpire" appointed by the judge reaching a unanimouls
award a
a
5. Enforcement- Under Arbitration Statutes
We turn now to an indquiry into the applicahility of the modern
American arbitration statutes of the pattern of the 1920 New York arbitra-
tion law to the irrevocable appraisal provision like that in the New York
standard fire insurance policy. Are the remedies provided by those statutes
31. Under the earlier act each party was to select his appraiser within fifteen days
after a statement of loss had been rendered by the insured to the insurer; Sturges
& Sturges, subra note 2, at 349. It was held sufficient if the selection were made
within that fifteen day period although notice thereof to the other party came later.
And the appraiser having been duly selected within the fifteen days an application to the
court to appoint an umpire was premature; Minnesota Farmers Nut. his. Co. v.
Smart, 204 Minn. 101, 282 N.W. 658 (1938). The fifteen days did not begin to run
until the statement of loss had been rendered by the insured so that an appointment
by the court of an umpire prior to that time was premature; Boston Ins. Co. v.
Jacobson Co., 226 Minn. 479, 33 N.W.2d 602 (1948).
32. Under the earlier act the appraisers were to agree upon an umpire within
five days; Sturges & Sturges, supra note 2, at 361. If the appraisers selected by the parties
failed to name an umpire within the five days the district court could do so regard-
less of why the two failed to name one or that they did not try to agree oil one;
Kavli v. Eagle Star Ins. Cr., 206 Minn. 360, 288 N.W. 723 (1939),
33. The 1955 statute also dropped the over-all time limitation in the earlier
legislation for demanding appraisal. The earlier act provided for waiver of the right of
appraisal unless, within fifteen days after statement of loss, "either party, the assured
or the company, shall have notified the other in writing that such party demands an
appraisal;" Sturges and Sturges, supra note 2, at 348.
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for the more direct enforcement" of arbitration provisions qualifying there-
under or for the more indirect enforcement" thereof by enforcement of
an award rendered thereunder available for the standard appraisal pro-
vision? This general question has been considered more frequently in the
New York courts than elsewhere. 3 ' Even so, less than one-half dozen cases
involving it have come before the appellate division or court of appeals
since the enactment of the New York Arbitration Law iin 1920.37 Only one
of them has been determined by the court of appeals. 8
In a number of New York cases prior to 1920, in connon with legal
lore in some other American opinions and in text books, various corn-
ientaries upon diffcrencs between insurance appraiscnenCut and statutory
or common law arbitration were composed. They consisted cither of quite
abstract generalizations, or of bald pronouncements that one is not the
other, or of both. The court of appeals appears in its recent opinions to
have relied upon at least sonic of these gcneralizations and pronouncements. "
34. Reference is here made to applications tnder the statutes for a general order
to proceed with arbitration and applications thereunder for cour appointment of
arbitrators.
We have indicated above how the application under the statutes by a defend-
ant in an action on a cause covered by an arbitration agreement to stay the trial
thereof pending arbitration effects the enforcement (irrevocability) of the agreement.
35. Reference is here made to applications under the statutes to confirm the
award and enter judgment thereon. Chief Judge Cardozo explained this proceeding
as one to enforce the arbitration agreement tinder which the arbitration was had in
these words: "I'he motion to confirm is equivalent to a suit in equity to carry into
effect the terms of the agreement and the arbitration had thereunder." Finsilver,
Still & Moss v. Goldberg, NI. & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 171 N.E. 579 (1930).
36. In Saba v. Homeland Ins. Co. of America, 159 Ohio St. 237, 112
N.E.Zd 1 (1953) the majority of the Supreme Court of Ohio sustained the probate
court in appointing an "oupire'' on application of the insored, the insurer having
refused to appoint an appraiser. The chief justice made the point in the course of
the opinion that enforcement of the standard appraisal provision by appointing the
umpire as the probate court did was consistent with the policy of the Ohio arbitration
statute, lie cited particularly the section thereof providing for court appointment of
arbitrators when necessary to fill an arbitration board.
37. They are, (chronologically listed): Williams v. lamilton Fire Ins. Co., 118
Misc. 799, 194 N.Y. Supp. 798 (Sup. Ct. 1922); Petition of Am. Ins. Co., 208 App.
Div. 168, 203 N.Y. Supp. 206 (1924); Fitzgerald v. Continental Ins. Co.. 275 App.
Div. 453, 90 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1919); Sigelman v. Travelers Fire Ins. Co., 279 App. Div.
771, 109 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1951); in re Delmar Box Co., 285 App. Div. 398, 137
N.Y.S.2d 491 (1955); 309 N.Y, 60, 127 N.E.2d 808 (1955). See also United Boat Set.
Corp. v. The Folton Fire Ins. Co. 137 N.Y.S.2d 670 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
38. In re I)elmar Box Co., suPra note 37.
39. The earlier New York cases which appear by citation or quotation in subse-
quent cases are (chronologically listed): Harris v. IBradshaw, 18 Johns, I. 26 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1820); Elineudorf v. Harris, 5 Wend. 516 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1830) per
Savage, C. J., and reporter's note at end of case; reversed, 23 Wend. 628 (N.Y. Ct.
Err. 1840); Carr v. Gomez, 6 Wend. 583 (N.Y. Sop. Ct. 1831); reversed, 9 \Vend. 649
(N.Y. Ct. Err. 1832) (see opinion of Senator Seward at 661); Bulson v. Lohnes, 29
N.Y. 291 (1864); Morton v. Cameron, 3 Rob. 189 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1865); DeGroot v.
Fulton Fire Ins. Co., 4 Rob. 504, 27 N.Y. 104 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1867); Brink v. New
Amsterdam Fire Ius. Co., 3 Rob. 104 (Sop. Ct. 1867); Linde v. Republic Fire Ins. Co.,
50 N.Y. 362 (Sup. Ct. 1884); Enright v. Montauck Fire Ins. Co., 15 N.Y.S. 893 (Sop.
Ct. 1891); Bradshaw v. Agricultural Ins. Co. of Vatertown, 137 N.Y. 137, 32 N.E. 1055
(1893); Fleming v. Assur. Co., 75 Hin. 530, 27 N.Y.S. 488 (Sup. Ct. 1894); Remington
Paper Co. v. London Assur Corp., 12 App. Div. 218, 43 N.Y.S. 431 (Sup. Ct. 1896);
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In view of the prestige and influence of that court and its usual alertness
to dogma and disposition to challenge it when it comes up in legal lore,
we are prompted to emphasize a critical view of the court's contribution
oil the general question at hand.
Noticeable is the want of any' declared Purpose by the court of appeals
in the course of its pertinent opinions and decisions to further the appraisal
process under the standard appraisal provision. And the court has been
quick to deny "any specific enforcement" of the provision unless and until
the Legislature provides "a statute clearly and specifically drawn for the
purpose." (Emphasis added.) In Matter of Deimar Box Co., in 1955,40
the court expressly ruled out the use of the enforcement renedics of the
arbitration statute in connection with the appraisal provision and awards
thereunder. hlie insured made application under the arbitration statute
for a general order against the insurer to proceed with appraisal. Special
tern granted the application; appellate division rcverscd; the court of
appeals sustained the reversal. It took the broad position that the standard
appraisal provision in the standard fire policy of that state does not con-
stituteca proviion for arbitration under the New York arbitration statute.
It cited what it considered as being "basic distinctions" betwcen insurance
appraiscncnt and arbitration and observed that they "have long prevailed."
XVe critically cxaminc below cach of these distinctions, as enunciated
by the court in Matter of Delmar Box Co., and the authorities which were
marshalled to confirm each declared distinction. In this latter connection,
it will be noted at the outset that all of the court's citations of its case
authorities for its declared distinctions are of "see" or "see also," quality-
1. Provision for appraisal as c2stinguished from provision for arbitration.
The court laid down its first distinction between arbitration and insurance
appraisal by declaring a distinction betwecn the agreement for arbitration
and the agreement for appraisal. Said the court an agreement for arbitration
"ordinarily encompasses the disposition of the entire controversy between
Strome v. London Assur. Co., 20 App. Div. 571, 47 N.Y.S. 481 (1897), aff'd. without
opinion, 172 N.Y. 627, 57 N.E. 1125 (1900); Kaiser v. 1amburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co., 59
App. Div. 525,69 N.Y.S. 344 (1901), aff'd. without opinion, 172 N.Y. 663, 65 N.E. 1118
(1902); Wurster v. Armfield, 175 N.Y. 256, 67 N.E. 584 (1903); Townsend v. Greenwich
Ins. Co. of the City of New York, 86 App. Div. 323, 83 N.YS. 909 (1903), aft'd. without
opinion, 178 N.Y. 634, 71 N.E. 1140 (1904); Steinberg v. Boston Ins. Co., 144 App.
Div. 110, 128 N.Y.S. 994 (1911); Turner v. N.Y. Cent. & 1.R.R.R. Co., 74 Misc. 524,
132 N.Y.S. 418 (Sup. Ct. 1911); American Steel Co v. German-American Fire Ins.
Co., 187 Fed. 730 (3d Cir. 191]); Freeman v. Ralph Realty Corp., 198 App. Div. 788,
181 N.Y.S. 72 (1921); Williams v. Hamilton Fire ins. Co., 118 Misc. 799, 194 N.Y.S.
798 (Sup. Ct. 1922). Matter of Fletcher, 237 N.Y. 440, 143 N.E 248 (1924) also
was cited by the appellate division and by the court of appeals in In re Delmar Box
Co., infra note 40.
40. 285 App. Div. 398, 137 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1955).
41. As heretofore pointed out, the court also has since ruled out any specific
enforcement of the provision by any plenary action for an equitable decree; 1 lappy Ilank
Auction Co. v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., I N.Y.2d 534, 136 N.E.2d 842, 154
N.Y.S.2d 870 (1956) reviewed supra p. 6.
1958]
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the patties, upon which judgment may be entered after Judicial confirnation
of the award, CPA 1464." (Emphasis added.) But an agreement for appraisal
'xtends merely to the resolution of the specific issues of actual cash value
and the amount of loss, all other issucs being reserved for determination in
a plenary action.''4 " To this statement of basic distinction is appended the
citation-"See Matter of American Ins. Co., 208 App. Div. 168, 170-171,
203 N.Y.S. 206, 207-208 [1924]." (Emphasis added.)
Other distinctions were set down by the court. Thcy relate more par-
ticularly to "the nature" of appraisal as differing from "the nature" of arbitra-
tion and how appraisers and arbitrators, or their respective roles, differ. Out
of those distinctions, the court derived further bases for concluding that
the two agreements are substantially different - at least in the abscnce of
precise statutory provisions overcoming regard for those distinctions. These
further differences as advanced by the court are reviewed below.
Aftcr listing and Sulmmarizing thcse further distinctions, the court con-
cluded that: "Accordiugly, it was welt settled, at least until 1941,1 a that the
42. It wil be noted at this point that the court has made no distinction between
the provision for appraisal of loss and damage to property insured and one for the
determination of business loss. The court has treated them, as if they were the same
on the questions at hand.
Certainly the foregoing generalization by the court that the agreement of appraisal
"extends merely to the resolution of the specific issues of the actual cash value and
the amount of loss," does not fit the agreement for appraisal of loss resulting from
business interruption. Fitzgerald v. Continental Ins. Co, 275 App. Div. 453, 90 N.Y.S.2d
430 (1949), illustrates this. (Te case is summarized, unote 48 infra). See also American
Ins. Co. v. Pickering ILmber Corp. 87 F.Supp. 512 (N.D. Cal. 1949); aff'd 183
F.2d 587 (9th Cir, 1950); 1[awkinson Tire Serv. Co, v. Indiana LIrmbernlens Mirt.
Ins. Co., 362 Mo. 823, 245 S.V.2d 24 (1952).
43. This reference is to the 1941 amendment of the arbitration statute-(N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Act § 1448. 'lhis section, the first section of the statute, was amended by
adding thereto the following: "Srch submission or contract [for arbitration] may
include questions arising out of valuations, appraisals or other controversies which may
be collateral, incidental, precedent or surbsequent to or independent of any issue
between the parties." (The clause "or independent of" was added in 1952). 'he New
York Legislative Comcil has declared that these amendients of the New York statute
(they appear in io other arbitration statutes of the New York type) were designed
to bring appraisals and valuations rndcr the arbitration law. New York State Legislative
Manual (1953) p. 401.
Obviously the amendment was unecessarily awkward. It being desired to bring the
standard appraisal provision under the arbitration statute it was easy enough to do so in
precise language. It was unnecessary to leave the matter in the air by declaring that an
a provision for arbitration it was unnecessarily confusing to pose the provision for
appraisal as a provision for arbitration and then to say that it may include questions
rising out of appraisals. Given any tradition as to the provision for appraisal being
different from a provision for arbitration it was urnecessarily confusing to pose the
provision for appraisal, as a provision for arbitration and then to say that it mar
include questions rising out of appraisals. On the other hand, the amendment was found
not to be beyond the wit of indicial constrrction arid adaptation. In 1949 the amendment
was held by the appellate division to bring the standard appraisal provision
inder the arbitration statute and subiect to the enforcement remedies. (The ease
involved business loss interruption-not loss or damage to physical property-; but
the court made no point of this difference in connection with its decision). Fitzgerald
v. Continental Irs. Co., 275 App, Div. 453, 90 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949). We note
below that this Case was overruled later-i 1955. The court of appeals in the In re
Delmar Box case cited the decision in the Fitzgerald case as having been "short lived."
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standard provision in a fire insurance policy for appraisal did not constitute
an agreement for arbitration and was not specifically enforceable under the
statutory procedure applicable to contracts for arbitration." (Emphasis
added.) The court documented this conclusion with a citation of cases
as follows: "See Matter of American Ins. Co., supra, 208 App. Div. 168,
203 N.Y.S. 206 (1924); See also, Wurster v. Armsfield, supra, 175 N.Y.
256, 264, 67 N.E. 584, 586 (1903); Strome v. London Assur. Co., supra, 20
App. Div. 571, 572, 47 N-Y.S. 481, 482 (1897), affirmed without 'opinion,
162 N.Y. 627, 57 N.E. 1125 (1900); Townsend v. Greenwich Ins. Co., supra;
86 App. Div. 323, 326-327, 83 N.Y.S. 909, 911-912 (1903), affirmed without
opinion 178 N.Y. 634, 71 N. E. 1140 (1904)."
All of the foregoing cases, with the exception of Matter of American
Ins. Co., supra, were decided prior to 1920. So it is manifest that neither
the decisions in those cases nor the utterances of the judges in the opinions
therein were considerate of any issue as to the availability of the remedies of
the 1920 arbitration statute to the standard appraisal provision or to pro-
ceedings or awards thereunder. Also, none of these cases, not even Matter
of American Ins. Co., concerned the same standard appraisal provision as
was written in the statutes at the time the court of appeals was making its
ruling in Matter of Delnar Box Co. in 1955. 44
XVc now proceed to a summary of Matter of American Ins. Co., as twice
cited above and approved by the court of appeals. Its position in the
jurisprudence of the State of New York on the general question at hand
seems significant indeed. It was the prototype, in 1924, of the opinion and
decision of the New York Court of Appeals in the Delmar Box case 31 years
later, in 1955. It appears to have influenced the court of appeals to adhere to
it in 1955 notwithstanding the 1941 and 1952 amendments of the arbitration
statute. And it appears to have influenced the Ncw York courts (appellate
division and court of appeals) to adhere to it to the point of overruling the
decision of the appellate division in 1949 in Fitzgerald v. Continental Ins.
Co.5
As will appear below its high persuasion and enduring force in New York
jurisprudence appear to rest upon its doctrinal generalizations of high ab-
straction upon differences between insurance appraisal and arbitration.
Matter of American Ins. Co. involved an application under the arbitra-
tion statute by the insurer for a general order against the insured to proceed
with appraisal u]]der the then existing standard appraisal provision. The
application was opposed chiefly - to quote the report of the case - "because
there is reserved to the insurer the right to contest its liability for the loss
on all other grounds of relief from liability."
44. Concerning the history of this provision in the New York standard fire
policy legislation, see Sturges & Sturges, supra note 2, at n. 24.
45. See note 48 infra.
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The insurer claimed that the only matter in dispute between the parties
was the amount of damages and that the appraisal provision qualified for
enforcement under the arbitration statute. The application was granted by
the court below but was reversed by the appellate division on this appeal.
According to the appellate division, appraisal and arbitration had been
distinguished for a long time; that the Arbitration Law of 1920 did not make
"agreements to determine certain facts by appraisal arbitrations, if they had
4iot such nature anterior to its enactment"; and that "the rule perists that
an agrcenit for the appointment of appraisers under the provisions of a
policy of insurance, . . . does not constitute an arbitration since the appraisers
are not authorized to pass on the question of the whole liability, but are
restricted to the question of damages arising from the loss." (Emphasis
added.)
It was further reiterated why the arbitration law was unavailable to the
petitioner as follows:
The Arbitration Law itself does not extend the hitherto recog-
nized type of arbitration, so as to include within its embracement
appraisals of incidental matters which are at times provided for in
contracts, and since, prior to the adoption of the Arbitration Law,
appraisals of the character provided for in insurance policies were
never considered as arbitrations, and were had quite informally with-
out the procedure of oaths, witnesses, notices of trial, and formal
awards, there is no reason indicated for a change thereunder. (Em-
phasis added.)
Said the court further: "If an appraisal under the fire policy were
equivalent to an arbitration in legal effect, the right of the petitioner would
be complete." (E7mphasis added.) But:
A distinction, however, has invariably been observed between the
reference of a collateral or incidental mnatter of appraisement and
calculation, the decision of which is not conclusive as to the ulti-
mate right of the parties, except the mere natter of amount due,
and the submission of all the matters that are in controversy be-
tween the parties for final determination upon the whole issue.
The distinction has been preserved, because the submission of a
collateral fact or of a particular question, without making the
whole controversy the subject of the determination of arbitrators,
is not deemed a coercive means, designed to put an end to the con-
troversy between the contentious parties. The fulcrum of this ruling
is that such an incidental reference of an amount due merely sub-
stituted the judgment of the appraisers for evidence of value on a
collateral matter, and left the rest of the controversy open for ad-
judication in the legal form. In such circumstances it has hitherto
been considered that a decision on such a subject was not award,
nor was the referring of such a matter to appraisers a submission to
arbitration. (Emphasis added.)
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And, concluded the court:
The doctrine thus formulated has been frequently reiterated in this
state, and it would be quixotic now to argue that the agreement
for an appointment of appraisers to determine merely the amount
of damage is a contract for submission to arbitration. Authorities in
this state have maintained the rule that the distinction between
agreements for an appraisal of damage and arbitration of the whole
dispute should be recognized. (Emphasis added.)
It will be observed that the foregoing opinion dwells upon differences
between appraisal and arbitration alleged to be already established and
existing under the law of the state. Such has been and such is the law -
with never a word as to why the law should be made as it was the first time
under the arbitration statute. A doctrine wanting more in meaningfulness
is difficult to discover in the reports of American judicial decisions.
Whether or not the court of appeals intended by its foregoing "See"
citations of Matter of American Ins. Co. to take over, adopt and vouch for
all of the doctrinal abstractions voiced in the opinion in that case, it certainly
seems to have intended to take over some of them. As is more fully indicated
below, it seems to have accepted the doctrines that arbitration covers the
"entire controversy" while appraisal covers merely'the specific issues of loss
and damage; that appraisal covers merely "incidental matters"; that appraisers
arc not arbitrators; that appraisal covers the submission of a "collateral fact
or of a particular question" - and is not designed "to put an end to the
controversy between the contentious parties." And apparently the opinion in
the American Ins. Co. case to the effect that since appraisal and arbitration
had been different for a long time, the Arbitration Law of 1920 did not make
"agreements to determine certain facts by appraisal arbitration if they had
not such nature anterior to its enactment," impressed the court of appeals.
And this persuasion prevailed with the court of appeals notwithstanding the
foregoing 1941 and 1952 amrendments of the arbitration statute. 41a
The court of appeals brought its opinion in the Delmnar Box case to a
close as follows:
It may, perhaps, be desirable to provide a procedure whereby the
insured may obtain specific enforcement, as against the insurance
company, of the agreement for appraisal. 4" If such be its aim, the
legislature uay accomplish it by a statute clearly and speefically
45a. The court cited some earlier New York cases; they are covered later in
this article.
46. The court had pointed out that, by making the appraisal provision irrevocable
by action, a one-sided specific enforcement was accorded to the insurer. "The
appraisal provisions," to quote the court in this connection, "were recognized
and enforced by the courts only to the extent that the insured was prevented from
maintaining an action on the policy in the event of his failure to comply therewith.
...The insured, however, had no remedy available to compel the insurance company
specifically to comply with the appraisal provisions."
The court's decisions in the Detorar Box case and in the Happy Hank Auction Co.
case, perpetuate this situation in New York.
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drawn for that purpose. A court cannot, however, read that design
into the statute here involved, particularly when the result would
be, not merely to permit the enforcement of such appraisal pro-
visions, but to effect the wholesale importation, into appraisement
practice, of the entirely different procedure governing arbitration.
(Emphasis added.)
So much upon the background and derivation of the first "basic dis-
tinction" by the court of appeals between arbitration and insurance ap-
praisal. Before touching more directly upon the distinction as it rests upon
alleged distinction of the arbitration agreement from the appraisal agree-
meait, wc will first criticize the views of the appellate division in the Ameri-
can Ins. Co. case and of the court of appeals in the Delinar Box case that
their basic distinctions "have long prevailed." In the Delmar Box case the
court of appeals, in commenting upon the process gcnerally required in
order properly to construe the 1941 amendment of the arbitration statute,
observed as follows: "It is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation
that the intention to change a long established rule or principle is not to be
imputed to the legislature in the absence of a clear manifestation. '" 7 (Em-
phasis added.)
It is to be noted that whcn this was uttered in 1955 the issue as to the
availability of remedies under the arbitration statute for the enforcement of
the standard appraisal provision had been decided iii the lower New York
courts only twice after the foregoing 1941 amendment of the arbitration
statute and only once before that amendment. In Fitzgerald v. Continental
Ins. Co. decided in 1949,4s the appellate division had sustained the insured's
47. Compare the iudicial attitudes advanced and the decisions made in Matter
of Berkovitz v. Arbib & tloulberg, 320 N.Y. 261, 130 N.E. 288 (1921); Finsilver,
Still & Moss v. Goldberg, M & Co., 253 N.Y. 382, 171 N.E. 579 (1930); Gilbert v.
Burnstine, 255 N.Y. 348, 174 N.E. 706 (1931). Cases cited in chronological order
for emphasis.)
48. 275 App. Div. 453, 90 N.Y.S.2d 430 (1949). As noted above, the court of
appeals, in the course of its opinion in the Delmar Box case, cited the decision as
having been "short-lived."
The insured made application for a general order against the insurer to proceed
with appraisal.
The appraisal provision was in a rider covering loss by reason of total or partial
suspension of business due to fire and it required that if the parties were "unable to
agree as to the value of the subject matter of this insurance or the amount of loss
thereunder . . . tho same shall be determined by appraisal in the manner provided
by this policy." The controversy which arose between the parties related only to insured's
claim to this loss; there was no controversy over the validity of the policy; and the
amount of loss to physical property had been agreed upon by the parties and that
amount had been paid by the insurer. Insured was claiming $12,000 business-interruption
loss; insurer claimed that insured had no loss on that account.
The court expressed the view that prior to 1941 this provision would not be
considered an arbitration agreement under the Arbitration Law. It cited Matter of
American Insurance Co., supra. The citation is. it seems, quite unsupported by any of
the rationale of the appellate division in that case which concerned only loss and
damage to physical property, not loss from business interruption.
In the Fitzgerald case, however, the court sustained the order of the court below
directing the insurer to proceed with petitioner to an arbitration under the arbitration
statute. The court appears to have relied in full measure upon the 1941 amendment of
the arbitration statute (N.Y. Civ. PRAc. Acr § 1448) whereby, as pointed out before,
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application for a general order against the insurer to proceed with appraisal.
That decision remained on the books during the next six years and until the
foregoing decisions in the Delmar Box case by the appellate division and
court of appeals in 1955. On the other hand, in Sigelman v. Travelers Fire
Ins. Co.4 ' decided by the appellate division in 1951 (and, of course, also
after the 1941 amendment) the court had sustained the denial of a motion
by the insured under the arbitration statute to confirm an appraisers' award
for the amount of loss and enter judgment thereon. The court disclaimed
any power to grant the motion notwithstanding the 1941 amendment relying
chiefly, it is believed, upon views expressed by the court of appeals in the
Syracuse Say. Bank case of 1950.
In short, prior to the 1941 amendment of the arbitration statute the
appellate division had in 1924 denied the availability of the enforcement
remedies under the arbitration statute for enforcement of the standard ap-
praisal provision, (Matter of American Insur. Co., supra); after the 1941
parties to an arbitration contract qnalifying under the statute "may include questions
arising out of valuations, appraisals or other controversies which may be collateral,
incidental, precedent or subsequent to any issue between the parties." See further upon
the amendment of this section, supra note 43.
But what if such questions, or any of them, arise under the standard al~praisal
provision in the standard fire policy, or under the suspension-of-business-loss rider to
such policy? (In other words, the parties have not used the very word arbitration in
their agreement fur appraisal). The court seems to have put this question in order to
frame its answer as if there were by its terms a provision (contract) for arbitration
qualifying as such under the arbitration statute. Said the court: "Does the aforesaid
amendment granting a permission or allowance of such 'inclusion' embrace a case or
situation where the contract to arbitrate includes only the subject matter stated in
the amendment?" (Emphasis added.)
How could this be under the abstract doctrines declared in Matter of American
Insurance Co., supra?
Said the court: "Unless the aforesaid 1941 amendment be construed so as to
make affirmative answer to this question, then it [the amendment] accomplished
nothing. It made no innovation upon existing law unless it permits the questions it
describes, one or more of them, to constitute the subject matter of an enforceable
agreement for the settlement of a controversy arising therefrom by arbitration." (Emphasis
added.) "The amendment," continued the court. "is remedial in character and should
be liberally construed . . . and be interpreted workably. It is presumed to have been
intended to serve some useful purpose . . . A construction which thus vitalizes it
constitutes the appraisal agreement in the policies within its reach as a valid and
enforceable contract to settle the instant controversy by arbitration." (Emphasis added.)
In other words, the text of the standard appraisal provision (at least when adapted
to business interruption loss) should be spelled out as a provision for arbitration by
virtue of the 1941 amendment.
Such was the standing of the decision in the Fitzgerald case until it was declared
outmoded in 1955 by the same court which had uttered it. It was overruled in deference
to the intervening opinion in 1950 of the court of appeals in Syracuse Say. Bank v.
Yorkshire Ins. Co., 301 N.Y. 403. 94 N.E.2d 73 (1950) reargt., denied, 301 N.Y.
731, 95 N.E.2d 48 (1950). All of this about the demise of the decision in the Fitzgerald
ease is written in In re Delmar Box Co., 285 App. Div. 398, 137 N.Y.S.2d 491 (1955).
The Syracuse Bank case is considered infra.
Enough is said upon the Fitzgerald case to indicate that the appellate division
genuinely undertook to honor the 1941 amendment of the arbitration statute and to
put it to work to balance out the rights and remedies of insured and insurer under the
standard appraisal provision. That court found no substantial difficulty in doing so.
It was overruled by the court of appeals.
49. 279 App. Div. 771, 109 N.Y.S.2d 115 (1951).
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amcndmct and relying upon it the appellate division had ruled in 1949 the
availability of those remedies (Fitzgerald v. Continental Ins. Co.); in 1951
it had denied the availability of those remedies to confirm an appraisers'
award and enter judgment thereon (Sigelnan v. Travelers Fire Ints. Co.) The
Fitzgerald ruling continued on the books until it was overruled by the
decisions in the Delnar Box case in 1955.
Thus far this resum6 indicates how little basis there was for the view of
the court of appeals that its first "basic distinction" had "long prevailed."
It is clear, of course, from the court's listing and enumeration in the
Delnar Box case of its "basic distinctions" - all cited as having "long pre-
vailed" - comprehended additional instances bcyond the alleged distinctions
of the two agreements. Differences as to the nature, procedure and practice
in proceedings Under the respective agreements also are indicated as having
"long prevailed." The opinion speaks of a "settled practice" in appraisal
under the standard appraisal provision different from that in arbitration.
rl'he court's opinion concludes, as quoted heretofore, that to apply the arbi-
tration statute to insurance appraisals "would entail, not only radical altera-
tion of tire settled practice in appraisal proceedings, but actual abrogation
of the greater informality which has long prevailed therein." (Emphasis
added.)
This "settled practice" is not apparent in modern usage. For reasons
heretofore indicated, the insurer rarely invokes the appraisal provision;
generally it will settle or litigate.'" Accordingly, it is concluded that, not-
withstanding the wide spread use of New York standard fire insurance policy
and the large number of losses covered thereby, there is relatively little prac-
tice in appraisal proceedings thereunder - even less any "settled practice"
therein.I
We also doubt that it is judicial cricket for the court of appeals to draw
any kind of "settled practice' upo the gcueral question at hand from
doctrinal gcncralizations in the opinions of lower courts of the state in cases
decided prior to the 1920 arbitration statute. The judges therein had neither
familiarity with nor concern for the issues to which the court of appeals
seems disposed in the Deltnar Box case to commit them. Even the court of
appeals' "See" or "See also" citations of those ancient cases do not overcome
the reality that the judges in the earlier cases did not know about and had no
purpose to pass upon the matters of practice in appraisals for purpose of the
issues involved in the Delmar Box case.--'
50. See Sturges & Sturges, sumra note 2, at 324.
51. \Ve also note infra, the uncertainties and confusion generated in some
of the opinions of the New York courts including the court of appeals as to precisely
what is required in certain important aspects of appraisal proceedings.
52. A reading of the "see also" cases as cited by the court of appeals, namely, the
Wurster, Strome and Townsend cases will, we believe, confirm our views in this
connection.
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We now return to consider more precisely the court's declared "basic
distinction" between an agreement for arbitration under the arbitration
statute and the standard appraisal provision.
\Ve have pointed out in an earlier article of this series that, in the
British and American cases first ruling provisions for appraisal of loss and
damage in insurance policies irrevocable when properly drafted, the pro-
visions were identified, regarded and talked about by counsel and the judges
as provisions for arbitration.' The report of Scott v. Avery (1856).1 in the
House of Lords is illustrative; so is the unanimous opinion of the Supreme
Court of the United States as rendered by Justice Stone in Hardware Deal-
ers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden and Co. (1931)."
It also is of very doubtful validity, we submit, to predicate a "basic
distinction" between the agreement for arbitration and the standard appraisal
provision upon the proposition as declared by the court of appeals in the
Deinar Box case that an agreement for arbitration "ordinarily encompasses
the disposition of the entire controversy between the parties" whereas the
provision for appraisal extends merely to the resolution of "the specific issues
of actual cash value and the amount of loss, all other issues being reserved
for determination in a plenary action." It appears to be more accurate and
more universally applicable to consider than an agreement for arbitration
(whether under the statute or at common law) ordinarily encompasses what-
ever controversy or controversies the parties may agree to arbitrate - no
more, no less. '" And the use of "the entire controversy" in the foregoing
context seems to be of little meaning. If the parties' controversy centers upon
and enbraces the amount of loss or damage, and no more, it is not apparent
why that controversy should not be counted as "the entire controversy'' -
if there is any reason at all to identify "the entire controversy." And parties
may, of course, come into controversy over matters "A," "B," and "C" and
agree to submit only "A." There is no reason to translate this submission
or agreement therefore away from a submission to arbitration because of any
doctrine requiring "the entire controversy" to be embraced. Of course, in the
opinion of the appellate division in the American Ins. Co. case 57 which the
court of appeals incorporated by its "See" citation upon its foregoing "basic
53. And this identification in those cases was no innovation in legal lore. See
Sturges & Sturges, supra note 2, at 5, 6.
54. 5 H.L. 811, 10 Eng. Rep. 1121 (1856).
55. 284 U.S. 151 (1931). See also Hamilton v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins.
Co., 136 U.S. 242 (1890); Hamilton v. Home Ins. Co., 137 U.S. 370 (1890); Shamfcroke
Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv. Corp. as quoted infra, pp. 26-27.
56. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Itlammer, Inc., 271 App.
Div. 917, 67 N.Y.S.2d 317 (1947), aft'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947); In re
American News Co., 130 N.Y.S.2d 544 (Sup. Ct. 1954), Robinson v. Robinson, 186
Misc. 859, 61 N.Y.S.2d 859 (Sup. Ct. 1945), aff'd, 296 NY. 778, 71 NE.2d 214
(1947); In the matter of Hub Indus,, Inc., 183 Misc. 767, 54 N.Y.S.2d 206 (Sup, Ct.
1944), modified, 269 App. Div. 177, 54 N.Y.S2d 741 (1945), aff'd as modified,
294 N.Y. 897, 63 N.E.2d 28 (1945); Canuso v. Philadelphia, 326 Pa. 302, AtI. 133
(1937).
57. See sup'ra p. 19.
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distinction" between appraisal and arbitration agreements, it was said that
"appraisers are not authorized to pass on the question of the whole liability,
but are restricted to the question of damages from a loss." (Emphasis added.)
It is inferred, of course, that the court of appeals intended to adopt much
the same idea in its opinion last quoted above as to the "entire controversy."
Clearly enough the submission under the appraisal provision of a dispute
over the amount of loss and damage is a submission of dispute over the
amount of liability and no other aspect of "liability" of the insurer to the
insured or other partics ini intercst. That amount may be realized in a sum
stated or it may be determined that "nothing is owed."5 8 When attention
is centered upon the appraisal provision and its identification and classifi-
cation, there is little reason to ascertain whether or not there may be any
other and different controversy outside the provision arising between the
parties. In the Delmar Box case the iusurcrs denied liability on the policies,
but the court of appeals does not appear to have counted that as any matter
of importance in ruling out the qualification and enforceability of the
appraisal provision under the arbitration statute. When there is no such
denial of liability on the policy, it has becn aptly pointed out how irrelevant
are the unknowns - namely, "the entire controvcry," the "whole liability." 59
It also will be noted that there appears to be consensus of judicial rulings
that a provision for arbitration qualifying under the arbitration statute does
not cease to be effective as such when the dispute arising thereunder em-
braces only a controverted claim over the amount of loss or damage ("dam-
ages") for default under the container contract. The provision and the
proceedings and award thereunder continue in the arbitration category.60
In Shanferoke Coal 6 Supply Corp. v. Westchester Sen'. Corp.6 decided
in 1934 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit covered
the matter as follows:
It is quite true that before any of the modern statutes, provisions
in contracts for the arbitration of incidental ismes [sic were treated
as valid and as conditions precedent. At times it has been thought
that the statutes do not covcr such arbitrations [sic] (In re American
Insurance Co., 208 App. Div. 168, 203 N.Y.S. 206); though the
question is perhaps open in New York (In rc 176 and 178 E. Main
Street, 238 App. Div. 248, 264 N.Y.S. 717). But even if this be
58. See F, M. Skirt Co. v. Rhode Island Ins. Co.. 316 Mass. 314, 55 N.E.2d 461
(1944) cited and quoted in Sturges & Sturges, supra note 2, at 12.
59. Dworkin v. Caledonian Ins. Co.. 285 Mo. 342. 226 SAV. 846 (1920).
60, See Marine Transit Corp. v. Dreyfus, 284 U.S. 263 (1931). And it seems
clear that the controverted claim between insured and insurer over the amount of loss
under the insurance policy hears no substantial difference, for the purpose at hand,
from the controverted claim of a shipper, for example, against shipowner for damages
sustained from loss of cargo as in the Dreyfus case. The insurer's refusal to pay
the amount claimed by the insured seems to bear no substantial difference from the
ship owner's refusal to pay the amount claimed by the shipper. See also in this con-
nection Trainor v. Phoenix Asstr. Co., 65 L.T.R. 825 (QBD 1892).
61. 70 F.2d 297 (2d Cir. 1934). See also Madawick Contracting Co. v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 307 N.Y. 111, 120 N.E.2d 520 (1954).
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true, a clause of general arbitration does not cease to be one within
the statute when the dispute narrows down to damages alone.
General Footwear Co. v. A. C. Lawrence Leather Co., 252 N.Y. 577,
170 N.E. 149; Marchant v. Mead-Morrison Co., 252 N.Y. 284, 298,
299, 169 N.E. 386. If the clause is general in form, it nwkes no
difference what may coi up under it. (Emphasis added.)
It is equally clear that in order to make a provision for arbitration that
will qualify under the arbitration statute the use therein of the very word
"arbitration" is not necessary. Also it does not appear to be determinative
against a provision being one for arbitratiori under the arbitration statute
that part of the text of the standard appraisal provision is used which calls
upon each party to select an "appraiser" and directs that "the appraisers
shall then appraise the loss.""2
-
Perhaps it should be undcrstood from the opinion of the appellate divi-
sion in Sigelinan v. Travelers Fire his. Co.' :' that the standard appraisal
provision would not qualify tinder the arbitration statute because the
provision carries no stipulation of entry of judgment upon the award. If such
were intended it appears to want validity because it has been held that this
stipulation is not required by the statute."
4
We now turn from the court's identification of the agreement for arbi-
(ration in furtherance of its foregoing distinction, to its views more particu-
larly upon the agreement for appraisal. The provision for appraisal, to quote
the court again, "extends inerelyvla to the resolution of the specific issues of
actual cash value and the amount of loss, all other issues being reserved for
determination in a plenary action."
As we have pointed out above, this generalization is not accurate
enough to be inclusive of, and account for, the disagrcement of insured and
insurer over the amount of business loss."" But, even with respect to the
narrower coverage of the amount of loss to property, the generalization is
not meaningful. As we havc indicated before, there may be no "other issues"
in the given case which arc "reserved for determination in a plenary action."
'The insurer may admit (or at least not deny) "liability." In such case the
amount of liability would be the role issue. In such cases, at least, it is diffi-
cult to push the provision aside as involving only a "collateral," "particular"
or "incidental" issue. But, suppose that the insurer denies all liability on the
62. In re Hub Indus. Inc., 183 Misc. 767. 54 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1944),
modified, 269 App. Div. 177. 54 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1945). aff'd as modified, 294 N.Y. 897,
63 N.E.2d 28 (1945); In re American News Co. Inc., 130 N.Y.2d 554 (Sup. Ct. 1954).
Compare Baltimore Contractors Inc, v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176 (1955).
63. 279 App. Div. 71. 19 NY.S.2d 115 (1951). (It was not included by the
court of aIppeals in its above cited "See also" cases).
64. Mltter of Resolute Paper Prod. Corp.. 160 Misc. 722. 290 N.Y.S. 87
(Sup. Ct. 1936); Steinberg v. Goldstein, 116 N.Y.S.2d 6 (Sup. Ct. 1952).
65. This use of "merely" to dwarf the agreement for appraisal and appraisals
thereunder is a quite prevalent handi maiden in the judicial process of distinguishing
them from arbitration agreements and arbitrations. For the purposes at hand it does
not seem very meaningful.
66. See note 48 supra and discussion therein of the Fitzgerald case.
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policy. A party to a contract containing an arbitration provision qualifying
under the arbitration statute may do likewise. Such denial does not foreclose
the qualification of the provision under the arbitration statute. It does not
displace the enforcement remedies for the other party to the arbitration pro-
vision under the arbitration statute unless and until the issue or issues as
to the validity of the container contract are duly heard by the court and
determined against validity. Thus, if the appraisal provision were under
the arbitration statute, and insurer denied all liability on the policy on the
ground, for example, of insurcd's fraudulent inducement of the making and
issue of this policy, or upon, for example, insured's non-compliance with or
breach of terms of the policy after valid issuance thereof, the court having
jurisdiction under the arbitration statutc should try the issues as to "the
making" and the issues as to the invalidation (validity) of the policy.67 And
certainly, in view of the limited scope of the appraisal provision in case of its
coverage of loss and damage to property, luitC as much as, if not more,
perhaps, than in case of coverage of business loss, there could be no difficulty
in determining that issues as to "liability" (validity) should be heard and
determined by the court."
Conclusion: It scems rcgettablc that the standard appraisal provision in
the New York standard fire policy which is in so wide usage throughout so
nmch of this country should be denied "any specfic performance" upon any
such insubstantial doctrinal generalizations as to the "basic distinction"
between the agreement for arbitration and the agreement for appraisal as are
relied upon in the Delmar Box case.'
1
67. Arbitration provisions are made valid, enforceable and irrevocable by the
statute "sm,e upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1448. See Harold Levinsohn Corp. v. Joint Board,
273 App. Div. 469, 78 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1948); Application of Mfrs. Chem. Co., 259
App. Div. 321, 19 N.Y.S.2d 171 (1940); Metro Place, Inc. v. Miscione, 257 App. Div.
652. 15 N.Y.S.2d 35 (1939); Application of Cheyney Bros., 218 App. Div. 652, 219
N.Y.S. 96 (1926).
See also, the rulings in the Minnesota eases wherein enforcement is accorded under
the Minnesota standard appraisal provision notwithstanding insurer's denial of liability;
Sturges and Sturges, sopra note 2, at 340-341.
In case of general arbitration provisions, some uncertainties have developed as to
whether or not a party should be allowed to put in issue any other matters than those
relating to initial "making" of the agreement, leaving it to the arbitrators to pass upon
claims of invalidation aceroing after the initial making of the agreement. See, e.g., Matter
of Lipman (Hfouser Shellac Co.) 289 N.Y. 76, 43 N.E.2d 817 (1942); Matter of Kramer,
288 N.Y. 467, 43 N.E.2d 493 (1942); In re Utility Oil Co., 69 Fed. 524 (2d Cir.
1939); In re Pahlberg Petition 131 F.2d 968 (2d Cir, 1942); Note, 24 N.Y.U.1.
Rev. 429 (1949).
In view of the limited scope of the appraisal provision, on the other hand, it
seems that the court should try the issues of subsequent invalidation quite as much as
those relating to initial "making." See in this connection the F. M. Skirt Co. ease,
316 Mass. 314, 55 N.E.2d 461 (1944).
68, Consult in this connection F, NI. Skirt Co. v. Rhode Island Ins, Co.,
supra note 67.
69. Another instance of difference between a provision for arbitration qualifying
under the arbitration statute and the standaid appraisal provision also was cited in the
Debmar Box case. In doing so the court confirmed its earlier ruling in Gervant v. New
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2. Concerning the appraisal and arbitration proceedings. As a second
instance of "basic distinction" - this time comparing appraisal and arbitra-
tion proceedings - the court of appeals declared that appraisal proceedings
are attended by a larger measure of informality, citing "See" - Strome v.
London Assur. Co., 20 App. Div. 571, 47 N.Y.S. 481 (1897) aff'd., without
opinion, 172 N.E. 627, 57 N.E. 1125 (1900); "and," said the court further,
"appraisers were 'not bound to the strict judicial investigation of an arbitra-
tion' "-citing "See" Matter of American Ins. Co. supra.
It is difficult to find the pertinency of the Strome case as cited by the
court of appeals to the foregoing "basic distinction." The insured sued in
that case to set aside an award of the amount of loss rendered in an appraisal
under the standard appraisal provision then in effect. The trial court set
aside the award relying upon two grounds, namely, that it was grossly inade-
quate in amount and for misconduct of the umpire.
There was no issue involving the declared "basic distinction"; more
important still, perhaps, the approach and decision of the appellate division
involved, not the differentiation hut instead the ruling together of insurance
appraisement and arbitration and how the appraisers' award should be con-
sidercd of the same force and effect as the arbitrators' award. On the other
hand, the court (appellate division) did generalize upon a distinction
bctwcen appraisal and arbitration and award as quoted below - not specify-
ing any particulars.
The parties had been unable to agree upon the amount of loss to physical
property; insured selected one Beatty as appraiser; insurer selected one Fried-
man; and the two appraisers selected one \Vechsler as "umpire." The
appraiser selected by insurer and the umpire in an award; the appraiser
selected by insured refused to join.
England Fire Ins. Co., 306 N.Y. 393, 118 NE.2d 574 (1954). (The Gervant case is
reviewed infra). The court had ruled, in accord with authorities in some other iurisdic-
tions that, after one "good faith" try at an appraisal which fails, the provision is no longer
irrevocable. Sturges & Sturges, supra note 2, at 363. In case of ai arbitration provision
qualifying under the arbitration statute the failure of one arbitration or award does
not lift the provision. [Concerning the repeat-process in action under the arbitration
provision see, for example, Finsil'er, Still & Moss v. Goldberg, M. & Co., 253 N.Y.
382, 171 N.E. 579 (1930)1.
The opinion in the Debyar Box case covered all this by saying that "the vacatur
of an arbitration award invariably results iu a new arbitration, N.Y. Civ, Prac. Act § 1462,
see Matter of Fletcher, whereas after an appraisal award hs been set aside without any
fault on the part of the insured, he is not required to submit to any further appraisement
but is free to litigate the issues in an action on the policy. See Ccrvant v. New England
Fire Ins. Co., 306 N.Y. 393, 400, 118 N.E.2d 574, 577." (Emphasis added.) The irony
of the insured being "free to litigate the issues" has been indicated heretofore, see Sturges
& Sturges, sura note 2, at 337-341.
It seems clear that when the remedies for enforcement of the appraisal provision
as provided in the arbitration statute are accorded the insured and insurer alike there
would be no basis for further acceptance of the ruling in the Gervant case any more
than in case of irrevocable arbitration provisions. And certainly that ruling can be no
plausible basis for denying remedies for enforcement of the appraisal provision on behalf
of the insured and insurer alike as contemplated in the arbitration statute.
1958]
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On this appeal the appcllatc division reversed the lower court which had
sct aside the award for inadequacy of the amount. The court's preface in its
opinion concerned some undesignated distinction between common law
arbitration and appraisement under the standard policy but it reasoned that,
notwithstanding, the appraisers' award on the issue at hand should be held
to bc of the same finality and conclusiveness as an arbitrators' award, as
follows: "The appraisement and cstimate under the New York standard
policy of fire insurance is not the same proceeding as an arbitration and
award at common law or under the Code." . . . '7 "Hence," to continue
70. The court cited Fleming v. Phocnix Assur. Co., 75 him. 530, 27 N.Y. Supp. 488
(Sup. Ct. 1894) and Enright v. Montauk Fire Ins. Co., 15 N.Y. Supp. 893 (Sup, Ct.
1891). In the Fleming case the supreme court (general term) sustained an award of the
two appraisers (without the umpire). The insured stied to collect on the policy dis-
regarding the award. Said the court: "It seems to be the theory of the plaintiffs
I insured I that an action may be maintained upon the policy independent of the award
of the appraisers; that the appraisement may be ignored, and the whole question opened
and litigated as if no valation of the loss had been made. It must be observed that
although some attack is made upon the appraisers and their mode of procedure yet it is
not sought to avoid the award. We think the appraisal was conclusive and binding upon
both parties."
So, the appraisers' award in this case as in the Strome case was final and conclusive
like any award.
The court also declared the appraisenient to be much more than an idle ceremony-
"'It was a judicious method of composing a controversy in a cheap and expeditious
manner." (Emphasis added.)
But the court felt called upon later-for no apparent reason-to observe that such
appraisers "are appraisers, and not arbitrators. Their function is to 'estimate and
appraise the loss' by personal examination and observation. They have no power or
authority to take testimony, arid their doing so is not contern plated." (Emphasis added.)
The court cited no authority for these observations and no case has been found in New
York or elsewhere sustaining that part of the last quoted sentence of the opinion that
the appraisers have no power or authority to take testimony.
We consider below the parties' right of hearing in appraisements under the
standard provision and under an arbitration provision.
In the Enright case, appraisal was had tinder a submission entered into by
insured and insurer after loss. Trhe submission was to one P and one W named in
the submission agreement "together with a third person to be appointed by them
if necessary, shall appraise and estimate at the true cash value the damage by the
fire to the property belonging to John Enright, which appraisement and estimate by
them, or any two of them, in writing, as to the amount of such loss or damage, shall
be binding on both parties." P and V selected a third person, T, but they proceeded,
as in the Fleming case, to an award without participation by T, ie., the two fell into
no disagreement so they did not call upon T to act. Was the award by P and W
valid? The insured challenged the validity of the award for want of T's participation;
that lie was a "third arbitrator" aud as such under the arbitration statute he must be
notified of the time and place of the appraisemeut, and should have been invited into
the deliberations of the other arbitrators. In overruling the objection the court declared
that the "proceeding was riot art arbitration, under the Code of Civil Procedure, and
therefore the requirements of section 2367 of the Code (lid not apply." (Emphasis
added.) The court sustained the award on the ground that "under the terms of the
subumission agreement it is quite evident that his [T's 1 position was rather that of an
umpire who should act only when the arbitrators Isicl differed; and the fact that the
arbitrators [sic] chose him before differences had arisen did not, we think, deprive them
of their power to act without him. or vest in him all their authority, as is urged by the
learned counsel for the appellant." (Emphasis added.) Clearly enough the court found it
natural to refer to the appraisers as arbitrators. Equally clear is it that once T was
identified as he was, i.e., as an "umpire" to decide only differences arising between the two
appraisers, It was of no consequence on the issue involved whether the proceding was
or was not an arbitration under the statute. And clearly the arbitration statute
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with the opinion, "the decisions in cases of arbitration and award are not
always applicable to the solution of questions arising under a fire insurance
appraisement. But even in arbitrations, strictly speaking, the courts do not
exercise the power of annulling the determination simply because the
amount awarded seems to be inadequate (Masury v. Whiton, 111 N.Y. 679,
18 N.E. 638); and we are of the opinion that no more stringent nile should
be applied to insurance appraisements, which are proceedings of a far
less formal character. (DeCroot v. Insurance Co., 4 Rob. [N.Y.] 504)."'
(Emphasis added.)
contemplates an "umpire" as well as arbitrators and a "third arbitrator." See N.Y.
Civ. Prac. Act § 1453. The validity of the award in the foregoing case would be
sustained in arbitration and appraisal alike against the challenge made against it.
As it is difficult to find what aid the Strome case brought to the above
"basic distinction" cited by the court of appeals in the Delnuar Box case, so is it
difficult to see how the Fleming and Enright cases aid the pronouncement declared
in the Strome case that insurance appraisement "is not the same as an arbitration
and award at common law or under the Code." The bald pronouncement that one
is not the other is accompanied by no particulars nor by any assignment of reason
why.
71. In this case (DeCroot v. Ins. Co.) decided by the superior court in 1867,
an appraisal was had under a provision in the policy which according to the court
stipulated that "the amount of sound value and damage, should be ascertained by
the examination and appraisal of each article by disinterested appraisers mutually
agreed upon, and until such appraisal, the loss should not be payable." In the course
of his opinion for the majority of the court, it was remarked by Robertson, C.J.:
"Such appraisers were at liberty to arrive at a conclusion in regard to the value of
the articles they were called upon to estimate, in such way as they thought proper;
they were not bound to the strict judicial investigation of an arbitration."
(Emphasis added.) The justice did not indulge in any particularzation or elaboration
of this statement. He cited to it, however, Elmeudof v. Harris, 5 \Vend. 516 (N.Y.
1830) n. 521-522. Carr v. Gomez, 9 Wend. 649, 661 (N.Y. 1832); Harris v. Bradshaw,
18 John. 26 (N.Y. 1820); Morton v. Cameron, 3 Rob. 189 (N.Y. 1865). 'hese cases
are reviewed below in this note.
It is not apparent how the foregoing statement had anything to do with the
issues before that court. Nor does it appear how it confirms the above citation in the
Strome case that insurance appraisements are "proceedings of a far less formal char-
acter" than arbitration. Nor does it appear how the statement in the Strome case so
citing the De Croot case lends any support to the court of appeals' commentary in the
Delmar Box case that appraisal proceedings under the standard appraisal provision are
"attended by a larger measure of informality."
The decisions of the court of appeals in the Gervant and Syracuse Bank cases
(reviewed infra) seem to belie this "larger mseasure of informality." See also, the legal
requirements attending these appraisals. Bonbright & Katz, Valuation of Property
To Measure Fire Insurance Losses, 29 Comiut. L. REv. 857 (1929).
It seems clear also that the requirements for the appraisers' award indicate no
special measure of "informality." Under the appraisal provision the appraisers shall
make an award "in writing," and it shall be itemized to state "separately actual cash
value and loss to each item."
And, as we point out below, the foregoing statement by Robertson, C.I., that
appraisers were at liberty "to estimate, in such way as they thought proper" is no
longer law in New York and it is doubted that it was ever the law of that state.
There also is considerable irony in advancing, even in this context, an idea about
"the strict judicial investigation of an arbitration," as offered by Robertson, C.J., and
by the court of appeals in the Delmar Box case. 'Whether at common law or under
the statute, "an arbitration" is quite at odds with any concept of "strict judicial
investigation." The "law of procedure" and the "substantive law" applicable in civil
causes in the courts are mostly displaced unless the parties clearly stipulate that they
be followed. Arbitrators are free to decide according to their honest judgment as to
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what ought to be unless the parties stipulate otherwise. The arbitrators' oath as written
in the statute N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1455 calls upon them "faithfully and fairly
to hear and examine the matters in controversy and to make a just award according
to the best of their understanding." What "strict judicial investigation" remains is
neither apparent nor readily inferred.
A word now as to the cases cited above by Robertson, C.f., to the effect that
appraisers are not bound to "the strict judicial investigation of an arbitration" upon
which the court seems to have relied in the above Strome case in declaring that insur-
ance appraisements are proceedings "of a far less formal character than arbitrations."
Elmendorf v. Harris takes us back to 1830 in the supreme court. No issue in the
case related to any appraisal provisions, submission, proceeding or award of loss tinder
a fire insurance policy. In the course of the opinion, however, Savage, C.J., covered
the point of right of hearing in an arbitration and whether or not want of notice of
the arbitral hearing was a good defense at law.
In so doing lie covered the earlier New York decision in Peters v. New Kirk, 6 Cow.
103 (N.Y. 1823) which had been cited. Said the justice about that case: "Peters
v. New Kirk was an action on the case for making a distress when no rent was due.
The rent had been liquidated at $87.75, and it was agreed that a shearing machine
should be received in part payment at the appraisal of one Sturges. He appraised the
machine at $85, which left $2.75 of rent due when the distress was made. The court
decided that the action brought by Peters did not lie, there being rent due. In the
opinion delivered it was said, (though not necessary to the decision of the cause)
that the appraisement was void for want of notice to the person to be charged with
it. This proposition is certainly consonant to reason and good sense, and is well
established as a Principle of equity." (Emphasis added.) Certainly this part of the
opinion by Savage, C.J., seems far removed from being a support for the foregoing
view advanced by Robertson, C.J.. Savage, C.I. did observe further, however, that
the appraiser's award in the Peters case "could hardly be dignified with the nanse of
an award"; and it seemed to him, without going into any particulars, that "there is
an essential difference between an award upon matters in controversy between parties
and a bare appraisement of a chattel." (Emphasis added.)
'lie foregoing citation by Robertson, C.]. to p. 522 in the report brings us to
an argumentative note by the reporter presenting generalizations in the abstract upon
alleged differences between an arbitration and "reference of a collateral fact." It
concluded nothing germaine to the decision in either the Elmendorf case or in Peters
v. New Kirk as discussed by Savage, C.J. Incidentally, the Elmendorf decision was
reversed in the court of errors, 23 Wend. 628 (N.Y. 1840) with deference to Peters v.
New Kirk and it was held that an award is subject to defeat at law as well as in equity
when notice of hearing is not accorded a party. 'l'he chancellor confirmed the report
of Savage, C.J. upon Peters v. New Kirk as follows: "There [in Peters v. New Kirk]
the supreme court of this state distinctly decided, that an appraisement which was to
control the rights of the parties, in the nature of an award, was a nullity, the appraise-
ment having been by the arbitrator [sicl to whom the parties had agreed to submit
the question, on the ex parte application of one party only, and without any notice
whatever to the other party, who was not present."
Neither Carr v. Gorne as decided in 6 Wcnd. 583 (N.Y. 1831) nor as reversed in
the Court of Errors 9 \Vend. 649 (N.Y. 1832) embraced in the foregoing citation by
Robertson, C.J., involved any question relating to any provision, submission, proceed-
ing or award fixing loss under a fire policy. Senator Seward, however, on the appeal,
declared upon the difference between a submission to arbitration and the agreement
of reference in the case to one Bolton to ascertain the amount due on certain accept-
ances. Said the Senator-having read the reporter's note to the Elmendorf case (quoted
below)- "A distinction is justly made between the reference of a collateral or incidental
matter of appraisement or calculation, the decision of which is conclusive of nothing
as to the rights of the parties, except the mere appraisal or statement and a submission
of matters in controversy for the purpose of final determination." fsic I (Emphasis added.)
'Tis distinction is indirectly suggested in the case of Elmendorf v. Harris, supra at 522,
and is more plainly stated in a note under the same case by the reporter. What the
Senator intended to say beyond "there is a difference" is, of course, not clear.
We find no reference to ain appraisement or an arbitration in Harris v. Brad-
shaw, 18 Johns 26 (N.Y. 1820) as cited above by Robertson. C.I.
Morton v. Cmneron, the last of the cases cited by Robertson, C.J., in the De
Croot case, 3 Rob. (26 Super. Ct.) 189, involved no provision, submission, proceed-
ing or award fixing loss under a fire policy. Robertson, C.I. participated iu the opin-
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On the insured's second count against the award the court sustained the
trial court ruling that the evidence established "an utter refusal and neglect
on the part of the umpire properly to perform his duties, and that his neglect
and refusal amounted to misconduct, in a legal sense, and requires the court
to withhold its sanction from an award made under such circumstances."
It seems clear that the misconduct found against the umpire would defeat
an award in an arbitration quite as much as an award in an insurance appraise-
neit. The court's story as to the umpire's course of conduct affirms this.
The court reported upon the matters as follows:
The umpire appears to have acted in a hasty and most perfunctory
manner in performing his functions under the policy. He went
to the plaintiff's residence, where the damaged goods were, with the
defendant's appraiser, Mr. Friedman, and was there half an hour
before the plaintiff's appraiser, Mr. Beatty arrived. He refused to go
over the goods with Mr. Beatty, saying that he had already gone over
them with Mr. Friedman. He would not even look at Mr. Beattv's
list of the articles and the values put upon theu. He said he did
not have time, and he scarcely listened to anything that Mr. Beatty
said. Such was the account of Mr. XVechsler's conduct given by Mr.
Beatty, and, although Mr. Friedman described it differently, the
trial judge was authorized to accept the statement of the plaintiff's
appraiser. His testimony indicates clearly that the umpire reached
a determination in favor of the defendant after hearing the defend-
ant's side of the case only, and practically refused to hear the
appraiser for the plaintiff. A decision made in this manner cannot
be allowed by a court of equity to stand.
Conclusion: The pronouncements used in the Delmar Box case for a
second "basic distinction" between insurance appraisement and arbitration
seem wanting of substance. The words "larger measure of informality"
accorded the appraisal and the "strict judicial investigation of an arbitration"
ions. But a provision, proceeding and decision of a person designated in a lease to
ascertain and determine the amount of damage committed by tenant to house and
furniture beyond reasonable use and wear and damages from the elements at end of
term were discussed by Robertson, C.J, in terms of being a "covenant to submit to
arbitration," the "arbitrator" and the "award," and the effect of the evidence as to
notice given by "the arbitrator" as to the time and place of hearing.
It is suspected that the root of all evil for the declaration of differences between
insurance appraisement and arbitration in the New York courts in terms of doctrinal
generalities of high abstraction may be found in the reporter's note at page 522 in
Ehnendorf v. Harris, supra. The note reads as follows: "An arbitration is a submission
by parties of matters in controversy to the judgment of two or more individuals, who
are substituted in the place of a judicatory established law, and who are to decide the
controversy; it is called a domestic tribunal, and the arbitrators judges of the parties
choosing, and is held in high estimation both by the legislature and by the courts;
the legislature having made provision for carrying into effect awards made, and courts
of law refusing to hear anything de hors the awards invalidating them, A reference
of a collateral fact, or the submission of a particular question, forming only a link in
the chain of evidence, is not calculated to put an end to the controversy; it barely
substitutes judgment of the referee in the place of evidence, leaving the controversy
open. Such reference or submission, although it has several of the characteristics of
an arbitration, falls short of it in its principal feature, the ending of the controversy;
public policy does not require that it should be considered as an arbitration, nor has
it been so treated by the courts." (Emphasis added.)
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have sonc lineage in New York jurisprudccc, as indicated in the footnotes,
but never have they becn made to mean anything in particular nor have we
found aiNv reasou advanced in the cases to give them any semblance of
validity.
3. Concerning swearing arbitrators and appraisers and right of hearing.
We now turn to thtc third "basic distinction" set out by the court of
appeals. It embraces swcaring the arbitrators under the statute and the
parties' right of hearing.
'Arbitrators,' said the court, 'arc required to take a formal oath,
Civ. Prac. Act, §1455, and may act only upon proof adduced at a
hearing of which due notice has been given to each of the parties,
Civ. Prac. Act, §1454. They may not predicate their award upon
evidence garnered through an cx parte investigation of their own,
at least unless so authorized by the parties. See Stefano Berizzi Co.
v. Kransz, 239 N.Y. 315, 146 N.E. 436. Appraisers, on the other
hand, arc not required to take an oath. See Syracuse Savings Bank v.
Yorkshire Ins. Co., 301 N.Y. 403, 411, 94 N.E.2d 73, 78; Wurster
v. Arnfeld, 175 N.Y. 256, 264, 67 N.El. 584, 586; Williams v. 11am-
ilton Fire Ins. Co., 118 Misc. 799, 194 N.Y.S. 798. The)y are likewise'not obligated to give the claimant any formal notice or to hear
evidence'; and they may apparently proceed by cx parte investiga-
tion, so long as the parties arc given an opportunity to make state-
ments and explanations to the appraisers with regard to the matters
in issue. See Kaiser v. Hamburg Bremen I'ire Ins. Co., 59 App. )iv.
525, 530, 69 N.Y.S. 344, 347, affirmed [without opinion], 172 N.Y.
663, 65 N.E. 1118. Townsencd v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 86 App. Div.
323, 326-327, 83 N.Y.S. 909, 911-012, affirmed [without opinion],
178 N.Y. 634, 71 N.E. 1140; Matter of American Ins. Co., supra,
208 App. Div. 168, 171, 203 N.Y.S. 206, 208. (Emphasis added.)
True it is that arbitrators are required by the arbitration statute, Civil
Practice Act section 1455 to take an oatl.h 2 I True it is also, that the court
of appeals had held that appraiscrs under the provision in the standard fire
policy are not required "to take a formal oath" - indeed, they are not
required to take any oath at all. 73
It will b emphasized in this connection that the taking of the oath
is neither a complicated ritual nor is it very time-consuming. Our observations
indicate that it is likely to take less than 60 seconds. It should not, of course,
prove any more onerous in case of appraisers than of arbitrators. Whether
it is required or not required of them seems therefore to be quite inconse-
qucntial as measured bv these considerations. Furthermore, the requirement
72. That this section of the arbitration statute requires the swearing of common
law as well as statutory arbitrators, see STURCES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS AND
AWARDS § 208 (1930); Htinkle v. Zimmerman, 184 N.Y. 114, 76 N.E. 1080 (1906);
Day v. Hammond, 57 N.Y. 479, 15 Am. Rep. 522 (1874).
73. Syracuse Say. Bank v. Yorkshire Ins. Co., 391 N.Y. 403, 94 N.E.2d 73 (1950).
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of the statute (N.Y. Civil Practice Act, section 1945) is lifted when the
"oath is waived by the written consent of the parties ...or their attorneys,"
or when "the parties have continued with the arbitration without objection
to the failure of the arbitrators to take the oath." When the requirement
is so lifted presumably the arbitration continues ag stch, nothwithstanding,
so that the existence or non-existence of the applicability of the oath require-
inent can hardly be a very subtsantial measure of any "basic distinction"
between arbitration and appraisement under the standard appraisal provision.
'o rely upon the swearing of the arbitrators, but not appraisers, as any reason
for denying specific enforcement of the standard appraisal provision seems
vcv dubious.
And why is the oath required? The statute (N.Y. Civil Practice Act,
section 1455) answers: "Before hearing any testimony." The make-up of the
oath is "faithfully and fairly to hear and examine the matters in controversy
and to make a just award according to the best of their understanding." Now
why should not appraisers under the standard appraisal provision as much as
arbitrators be subject to the requirement of this oath as written in the arbi-
tration statute - which is applicable alike to common law and statutory
arbitration?
The court of appeals had explained its view on this question in 1950 in
the Syracuse Savings Bank case, as follows:
We see nothing in section 1448 of the Civil Practice Act as
amended in 1941, requiring the appraisal authorized by section 168
of the Insurance Law, Consol. Laws, c. 28, to be treated as an
arbitration proceeding .... 74 There is nothing in the policy provision
relating to appraisal which gives an appraiser the status of an arbi-
trator or requires him to sign an oath. It is well established that the
determination of a fire loss is not an arbitration proceeding, Matter
of Fletcher (Nicholas), 237 N.Y. 440, 143 N.E. 248;'1 Townsend
v. Greenwich Ins. Co., 86 App. Div. 323, 83 N.Y.S. 909, affirmed
[without opinion] 178 N.Y. 634, 71 N.E. 1140; Strome v. London
Assur. Corp., 20 App. Div. 571, 47 N.Y.S. 481, affirmed [without
opinion] 162 N.Y. 627, 57 N.E. 1125; Matter of American Ins. Co.
(Wasserman), 208 App. Div. 168, 203 N.Y.S. 206; Williams v.
Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., 118 Misc. 799, 194 N.Y.S. 798; 6 Appleman,
74.In the Delmar Box case the court also ruled that the 1952 amendment adding
to section 1448 the further words "or independent of" (the text is reported supra
note 43) had no greater effect than the 1941 amendment. "Neither amendment,"
said the court, "discloses any design to alter the settled rule that 'the determination
of a fire loss (by appraisal] is not an arbitration proceeding.' "
75. It seems reasonably clear that the court of appeals intended in this case to
differentiate the standard appraisal provision from the provision for valuation and price
fixing therein ruled not to qualify tinder the arbitration statute then in effect-i.e., 1924.
Said the court: "It is to be noted at the outset that the contract under consideration
does not provide for a determination of damages for which one of the parties may be
liable in law; it does not provide for a determination of any question after disagree-
ment of the parties upon that question: it does not attempt to substitute a tribunal
created by contract for a court of justice in a dispute which would otherwise be
justiciable by the courts." (Emphasis added.)
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Insurance Law and Practice, §3922, p. 321 and that an appraiser's
oath is unnecessary, Wurster v. Amifield, 175 N.Y. 256, 264, 67 N.E.
584, 586; Matter of American Ins. Co., supra; Williams v. Hamil-
ton Fire Ins. Co., supra; Turner v. New York Central & 1H. R.R. Co.,
74 Misc. 524, 132 N.Y.S. 418. (Emphasis added.)
Only Williams v. Hamilton Fire Ins. Co., supra, of the foregoing cited
cases, dealt with the question whether or niot appraisers under the stand-
ard appraisal provision must be sworn like arbitrators. The court held that
they need not be sworn, commenting as follows: "lere but one matter was
subuitted to the appraisers and that was the amount of the damage. They
had no authority to pass upon the question of liability. If there can be any
submission which i. not an arbitration, it would seent that such a submission
as this would be one." (Emphasis added.) And the abstract generalities and
pronouncements are quoted from earlier cases to conclude that appraisers
are to determine "merely the anount of damage;" they are not arbitrators;
also that the Arbitration Law did not broaden the scope of arbitration beyond
the ancient limits excluding appraisals. Concerning right of hearing. We
leave the foregoing generalizations of the court of appeals in the Syracuse
Bank case and of the supreme court (appellate term) in the Williams
case concerning the swearing of appraisers. We fail to find that any
substantial reason has been voiced by either court for treating appraisers
differently from arbitrators. We are told no more by the court of appeals
thal that it "sees nothing" in the 1941 amendment "requiring" appraisers
under the standard appraisal provision "to be treated" as arbitrators and
that there is "nothing in the policy provision" which "requires him
[the appraiser] to sign an oath." These observations, so completely
negative, indicate no good reason for the decision. Certainly neither
the 1941 amendment, nor the standard appraisal provision, precluded the
swearing of the appraiser. Ve also leave once more the court's foregoing
dogma that "It is well established that the determination of a fire loss is not
an arbitration proceeding."
We come next to the views of the court as set down in the Delinar Box
case regarding the parties' right of hearing in appraisals under the standard
appraisal provision. By "right of hearing" we mean the right of each party,
as in both comnion law and statutory arbitrations, unless he waives it by
stipulation, or course of conduct, (I) to reasonable notice of time and place
of hearing before the appraisers in the matters in issue, (2) hearing by the
appraisers in due quorurn and (3) the right of each party to present evidence
therein and to cross-examine opposing evidence. According to the foregoing
opinion of the court of appeals in the Dehlnar Box case: "They [appraisers
under the standard appraisal provision] are likewise not obliged to give the
claimant any formal notice or to hear evidence; and they may apparently
proceed by ex parte investigation, so long as the parties are given an oppor-
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tunity to make statements and explanations to the appraisers with regard to
the matters in issue."76 (Emphasis added.)
76. Apparently the court gained part of this confusing generalization from the
opinions in the three cases which it cited.
In the first of these cases, Kaiser v. Harnburg-Bremen Fire Ins. Co., 59 App.
Div. 525, 69 N.Y. Supp. 344 (1901), aff'd without opinion, 172 N.Y. 663, 65 N.E. 118
(1902), it is not clear that the right of hearing was in issue. The appellate division in-
cluded in its opinion, however, some generalizations like those used in the Delmar Box
case. It does not appear whether or not the insured, who was suing to set aside the
appraisers' award, had notice from the appraisers of a time and place for hearing. The
court was however, disposed to indicate that if such notice had not been given that fact
might have a bearing in determining whether or not the appraisers were guilty of
misconduct sufficient to defeat the award.
The court generalized on the right of heating as follows: "The rule at common
law, and under the statute and Code, requiring notice to the parties of the meeting
of arbitrators, and an opportunity to present evidence [Halstead v. Seman, 82 N.Y. 27
(1880); Day v. Hammond, 57 NY.479 (1874)] has not been applied with strictness
in all cases of insurance appraisals. Such appraisals are regarded as still more informal,
and the appraisers are not obliged to give the claimant any formal notice or to hear
evidence,-at least, not in all cases; and yet it is quite clear that, unless the insured
waive it, he must either have notice or knowledge of the meeting and an opportunity
to draw their attention to the items of his loss, and make representations and explana-
tions to them concerning the nature thereof, and thus insure a consideration of his
entire claim and guard against onissions and misconduct." (Emphasis added.)
No useful purpose in making so complex and uncertain the right of hearing is
reported by the court. Fairly clearly, however, it did cut across the declaration of
Robertson, C.)., in DeGroot v. Ins. Co., in 1867 (reviewed supra note 71) that
appraisers "were at liberty to arrive at a conclusion in regard to the value of the
articles they were called upon to estimate, in such way as they thought proper; they
were not bound to the strict judicial investigation of an arbitration." (Emphasis added.)
It seems also to have cut across the further statements by Robertson, C.J., in
Brink v. New Amsterdam Fire Ins. Co., 28 N.Y. 104 (Super. Ct. 1867) decided
in the same year as the DeGroot case. In the Brink case his opinion reads: "There
is scarcely a day in which, in commercial transactions, the valuation of property
or estimate of damages is not entrusted to third parties, and no one has yet dreamed
of looking upon them as arbitrations, and subjected to all the formalities imposed upon
them by the Revised Statutes [2 R. S. 541, §§ 1-25, Bulson v. Lohnes, 29 N. Y. Rep.
291 (1864)] with the paraphenalia of oaths, witnesses and notices of trial. It is most
frequently confided to the personal skill, knowledge or experience, or even acquired
information of appraisers, and even in case of a statutory delegation of authority as
between the public and individuals (Matter of John and Cherry Streets, 19 Wend.
659), they may rely on their personal inspection and appraisal." (Emphasis added.) (Prior
to these remarks the justice seems to have indicated in his opinion that whether an
arbitration or appraisal were involved the results would be the same on the issue before
the court.) Compare Remington Paper Co. v. London Assur. Corp., 12 App. Div. 218,
43 N.Y. Supp. 431 (1896); Linde v. Republic Ins. Co., 50 N. Y. Super Ct. 362 (1884).
The Kaiser case appears to have disregarded the views expressed by Savage, C.'., and
the chancellor in the Elmendorf case in tle supreme court and court of errors [5
Wend. 521 (N.Y. 1830); 3 Wend. 628 (N.Y. 1840)] (reviewed supra note 71) in
connection with the earlier New York case of Peters v. New Kirk cited therein. It was
their view that the ex pate appraisal in the Peters case without notice to the parties in
interest was void at law and in equity alike. See also Linde v. Republic Fire Ins. Co,, supra.
The opinion in the Kaiser case was conciliatory and compromising of the position
taken in Fleming v. Phoenix Assur. Co., 27 N.Y. Supp 188 (Sup. Ct. 1894) (reviewed
supra note 70), that appraisers "have no power or authority to take testimony, and their
doing so is not contemplated." What the court in the Kaiser case intended to do with
these views is not clear. It recognized them, but continued that, nevertheless, "it
would seem that as to items wholly destroyed, or otherwise not visible or open
to inspection, the appraisers must act on information or evidence, for otherwise they
could not make a just estimate of the loss. We think it is a fact that may be
taken judicial notice of that it is usual and customary for the owner or his repre-
sentative to make statements to the appraisers and their failure in this instance to
listen to such statements is some evidence in support of the contention (by the insured)
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that Vonderwef [the appraiser nominated by the insurer about whom insurer made
false representations to insured to induce insured to accept him] was not an unpreiu-
diced and disinterested appraiser." (Emphasis added.) (See also Linde v. Republic Fire
Ins. Co., supra.)
By citing the Kaiser case to its statement upon the parties' right of hearing the
court of appeals in the Delmar Box case did not aid in resolving the confusion among
these lower court cases nor make clear when or in what precise particulars the right of
hearing in arbitrations is to be cut down in insurance appraisement-nor is any good
reason offered in support of the departure.
'uhe court in the Delnar Box case also included a citation of Townsend v. Green-
wich Ins. Co., 86 App. Div. 323, 83 N.Y. Supp. 909 (1903), aff'd, without opinion,
178 N.Y. 634, 71 N.E. 1140 (1904). This case came to the appellate division in 1904,
three years after the Kaiser case, supra.
The insured sued in disregard of a unanimous award of the two appraisers and
umpire to collect on the policy. Judgment for the insurer was affirmed on this appeal.
The Court went into the question of the parties' right of hearing as follows: "The
plaintiffs insist upon referring to the appraisers as arbitrators, and urge various
matters which might be of importance if they were, in fact arbitrators; among
them, that the plantiffs never had any notice of the meetings of the appraisers,
etc. The provisions of a standard insurance policy that in event of a disagreement
the amount of the loss shall be determined by 'two competent and disinterested
appraisers, the insured and this company each selecting one, and the two so
chosen shall first select a competent and disinterested umpire,' contemplates that
each party shall have a representative, each having an equal voice in the selection
of the umpire, and that the determination shall fix, not the liabilities of the parties
under the law, but the amount of the value of the property destroyed. This does
not oust the court of any part of its jurisdiction, and, in the absence of bad
faith, the mere fact that the parties are not given notice of the meetings of
the appraisers does not affect the validity of their proceedings. The appraiser
selected by the plaintiff is his representative. He is chosen for the purpose of
guarding the rights of the man who selects him; and it must be assumed, in the
absence of evidence to the contrary, that he has discharged this duty, and that
the plaintiff has had opportunity of being heard, if such a hearing was necessary
to the preservation of his rights." (Emphasis added.)
This casting of each appraiser in the role of advocate for the party who selected
him as appraiser seems neither useful nor desirable. The appraisal provision calls for"competent and disinterested" appraisers. It also distorts the function of the umpire
as fitted out in the appraisal provision.
One also must question why, if there is to be any semblance of right of hearing,
that it may be realized only through the appraiser. Furthermore, tinder the foregoing
opinion, who is to decide that plaintiff had "opportunity of being heard" and to
decide "if such a hearing was necessary to the preservation of his rights"?
While the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the foregoing decision (without
opinion) that court had long before frowned upon the thesis of the party's selection
as appraiser being his advocate. Thus in Bradshaw v. Agricultural Ins. Co. of Water-
town, 137 N.Y. 137, 32 N.E. 1055 (1893), the court championed what seemed to
be quite the opposite role for the appraiser. Referring to the course of conduct of
the appraiser nominated by the insurer, the opinion reports that when lie came on the
scene "he seems to have taken the leading part. The evidence returned in this record
is such that a jury might say that he abandoned his duties as a disinterested appraiser.
Instead of being disinterested, the inference might be drawn that he acted as a sort of
counsel for the defendant, and bound, as such, to obtain the best possible award for
it that he could; that he did not act on the theory that, although nominated by the
defendant, it was nevertheless his duty, as a disinterested appraiser, to make an award
that should, so far as he knew, represent the honest and actual loss sustained by the
insured by reason of the fire .. " (Emphasis added.)
"While it may be true," the court continued, "that in the appointment of these
appraisers each party nominates sone one who may be supposed friendly to the side
nominating him, yet he should at the same time be disinterested, or, in other words,
fair and unprejudiced. The duties of these appraisers are to give a just and fair award,
-one which shall honestly and fairly represent the real loss actually sustained by reason
of the fire; and it is not the duty of either appraiser to see how far he can depart
from that purpose, and still obtain the consent or agreement of his associate, or, in
case of his refusal, then of the umpire. It is proper, and to be expected, that all the
facts which may be favorable to the party nominating him shall be brought out by the
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The court of appeals also commented upon the quorum requirement in
common law and statutory arbitrations, namely, that "all of the arbitrators,
if there be more than one, 'must meet together and hear all the allegations
and proofs of the parties.' Civil Practice Act §1456," inight not apply to
appraisal because the standard appraisal provision "specifically recites that
the umpire is not to participate in the appraisal in all cases, but is only to
pass on such differences as there may be between the appraisers designated
by the respective parties." We have observed above that an umpire with
the same functions under the parties' arbitration agreement as those indicated
above by the court may serve an arbitration as well as an appraisement. The
designated role of the "umpire" under the standard appraisal provision is
no valid ground to foreclose insurance appraisement from arbitration because
his role is equally adaptable and useable in one as in the other.
\Wc also have the concluding summary of the court in the Delmar Box
case which embraces the right of hearing. After reviewing the 1941 and
1952 amendments of the arbitration statute (N.Y. Civil Practice Act section
1448) it found that there is "no indication whatever that the legislature
intended to make applicable to fire insurance appraisals the more formal
practice prevailing in arbitration with regard to such matters as oaths, notice
and hearing, the sittings of the arbitrators, the entry of judgment upon con-
firmation of an award or the consequences following upon the vacatur of
an award." (Emphasis added.)
Just what the court of appeals intended by its foregoing text qualifying
or limiting the parties' right of hearing is not clear. Some cnt-down in the
right of hearing in insurance appraisals from that existing in arbitration is
involved - but in what particular; and why; is not clear.
We also will add that the views of the court in the Gervant and Syracuse
Bank cases as set out below upon the right of hearing in appraisal belie the
generality of the greater "informality" of appraisal over arbitration and the
"more formal practice prevailing in arbitration."
appraiser, so that due weight may be given them; but the appraiser is in no sense, for
the purpose of the appraisal, the agent of the party appointing or nominating him,
and he remains at all times under the duty to be fair and unprejudiced, or, in the
language of the policy, disinterested." (Emphasis added.)
This being the role of the appraiser. we repeat that it is not apparent why he
also should have the exclusive power to present the claims or evidence of the party
nominating him as appraiser as to the amount of loss or damage to the appraisal
board; nor is it any good reason to exclude both the insured and insurer from the right
of cross examination accorded in arbitrations and civil proceedings generally. We again
conclude that the citation of the Townsend case by the court in the Delmar Box case
upon its statement concerning the parties' right of hearing clarified neither the par-
ticulars of, nor reason for, a lesser right of hearing in insurance appraisement than in
arbitrations.
Matter of American Ins. Co. was the third and last case cited to the court's
statement on right of hearing in the Delmar Box opinion. We have heretofore reviewed
the absfractions and dogma as uttered and referred to in the opinion in that case.
(supra pp. 6, 19). Suffice it to note now that those abstractions do not seem to clarify
why there should be some lesser right of hearing in insurance appraisals than in arbitia-
tions.
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Certainly the right of hearing as established it arbitration is no less
significant to the parties in insurance appraisals. Unless the parties waive the
right (by stipulation, or course of conduct) it is not at all clear why there
should be, in any respect, a lesser right of hearing in these appraisals than
in arbitrations.
It should be recalled in this connection that the standard appraisal
provision has been spelled out and prescribed by the legislature. It is doubted
that it could constitutionally command the use of that provision and also
deny the parties' right of hearing in appraisals thereunder. It seems equally
clear that the court of appeals should claim no greater power to alter or deny
the right of hearing in such appraisals. 7
\Ve turn now to the confusion among the cases decided by the court
of appeals itself upon the parties' right of hearing. As the court has left
intact the confusion upon the right of hearing as voiced in the lower courts
in the Kaiser, Townsend, and American Ins. Co. cases, as cited by the court
to its statement upon the right of hearing in the Deimar Box case, so has
it created confusion within its own decisions on the same question.
The court's view in the Delmar Box case was advanced without ref-
crcnc to that court's opinion and decision on the right of hearing a year
earlier (i.e. in 1954) iii Gervant v. New England Fire ins. Co.7 8 The views
and decision in that case on the question at hand were ignored although
the Cenant case was cited in another concution.
In that case the insured sued to vacate an award of loss and damage.
The award was rendered by the appraiser selected by the insurer and the
umpire. The appraiser selected by insured did not join. The court of appeals
sustaincd the lower court in vacating the award. The court stated the "prin-
cipal issue" as follows: "The principal issue raised by plaintiff at the trial
was that the npire and the appraiser selected by the insurance company
77. In Hardware Dealers' Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Glidden Co., 284 U.S.
151 (1931) the Supreme Court sustained proceedings under the standard policy leg-
islation of the State of Minuesota involving specific enforcement of the appraisal
provision. The specific enforcement consisted of court appointment of an "umpire"
to sere with insured's appraiser upon refusal of insurer to nominate an appraiser; also
the sustaining of an ex parte appraisal and award rendered by the two. Vhile sus-
taining this enforcement under the mandatory standard policy against charges of uncon-
stitutional denial of due process and equal protection of law, justice Stone pointed out
that since the insurer's objections were directed "specifically to the power of the state
to substitute the one remedy [appraisal] for the other [civil action], rather than to
the constitutionality of the particular procedure prescribed or followed before the
arbitrators, it suffices to say that the procedure by which rights may be enforced and
wrongs remedied is peculiarly a subject of state regulation and control." (Emphasis
added.) And again: In the exercise of such power, the state "may choose the remedy
best adapted, in the legislative judgment, to protect the interests concerned, provided
its choice is not unreasonable or arbitrary and the procedure it adopts Satisfies the con-
stitutional requirement of reasonable notice and opportunity to be heard." (Emphasis
added.)
78. 306 N.Y. 393, 118 N.E.2d 574 (1954). See also, Bonbright & Katz,
Valuation of Property to Measure Fire Insurance Losses, 29 Co.M. L. REV. 857 (1929).
[VOL. XlIl
APPRAISALS OF LOSS AND DAMAGE
were guilty of misconduct, in a legal sense, in that they only considered evi-
dence of replacement cost less depreciation in making the award and flatly
refused to consider other pertinent evidence presented by plaintiff's appointed
appraiser bearing on the 'actual cash value' of the premiscs." (Italics by the
court.)
After reviewing the evidence the court concluded that the record "amply
supports the finding of the appellate division that the amount of the award
was reached by hearing and receiving evidence of the reproduction cost less
depreciation only to the intentional exclusion of all other pertinent factors
of value." (Emphases added.)
The court continued as follows:
The Appellate Division was also correct in concluding, in view of
our decision in McAnarney v. Newark Fire Ins. Co., 247 N.Y. 176,
159 N.E. 902, 903, 56 A.L.R. 1149, that the 'actual cash value' of
premises under a standard fire insurance policy in this State cannot
be arrived at by receiving evidence of replacement cost less depre-
ciation only. Rather, the trier of fact should listen to all pertinent
evidence on the subject. We went on to point out, 247 N.Y. at page
184, 159 N.E. at page 905: 'XVhere insured buildings have been
destroyed, the trier of fact may, and should, call to its aid, in order
to effectuate complete indemnity, every fact and circumstance which
would logically tend to the formation of a correct estimate of the
loss. It may consider original cost and cost of reproduction; the
opinions upon value given by qualified witnesses; the declarations
against interest which may have been made by the assured; the gain-
ful uses to which the buildings might have been put; as well as any
other facts reasonably tending to throw light upon the subject.
(Emphasis added.)
It is observed from the report of the case also that while the insured
"said a lot of things" to the umpire about valuing the property, the court
centered its attention principally upon the presentations made by the
appraiser selected by the insured. "Here the umpire and the company's
appraiser," said the court, "arbitrarily refused to admit evidence of the variety
of facts which enter into the determination of 'actual cash value' despite the
fact that evidence of such factors was directly presented to them by plaintiff's
appraiser." (Emphasis added.)
"It is manifest," continued the court "that the Appellate Division based
its determination on the rule that an umpire and one appraiser are not free
to disregard, arbitrarily, pertinent evidence presented by the other, and that
a flat refusal on their part to hear such evidence is condemned by authorities
in this State as legal misconduct for which the award will be set aside" citing
the Strome and Kaiser cases. (Italics by the court.)
The court concluded in this connection that: "The right of a party to
have appraisers receive all pertinent evidence offered is a fundamental pro-
cedural right to which plaintiff was entitled, and its denial by the umpire and
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the company's appointed appraiser has been characterized as 'misconduct,
in a legal sense' which is sufficient under the above authorities to set aside
the award in equity," (lEmphasis added.)
By the foregoing opinion the court obviously emphasized the "refusal"
- the "flat refusal" - of the umpire and one appraiser to listen to the evi-
deuce offered by or on behalf of the plaintiff - insured.
But it seems very difficult to cut down or confine this view of the court
to the situation wherein the insured, or the appraiser for the insured, has
received tire "flat refusal." In other words, it seems that the foregoing views
of the court would require that the party have reasonable notice of time and
place to wage his evidence before the appraisal board in due quorum in
order for it to gain "every fact and circumstance which would logically tend
to the formation of a correct estimate of the loss." The scope of the appraisal
inquiry as laid out by the court seems clearly to comprehend the right and
opportunity to be heard as known to arbitrations. "Flat refusal" can be sine
qua non to this. And certainly, it is not clear why evidence so admitted
should be ruled immune to reasonable cross-examination. The one type of
evidence (or testimony) is as competent and pertinent as the other to
facilitate "a correct estimate of the loss."
In the light of the foregoing views of the court in the Gervant case in
1954 how should the views of the court in the Delinar Box case in 1955 be
understood when it is said (without citing Gervant) that the appraisers are
'not obliged to give the claimant any formal notice or to hear evidence';
and they may apparently proceed by ex parte investigation, so long as the
parties are given an opportunity to make statements and explanations to the
appraisers with regard to the matters in issue"? (Emphasis added.)
Is it to be understood that it is for the parties to catch-as-catch-can with
respect to the doings of the appraisers and gain "an opportunity" to make
"statements and explanations"? It seems difficult to believe that the court of
appeals wants any such disorganized way of managing these proceedings.
It seems clear that such rule could do nobody any good and could defeat
the rights of either party in almost every case.
It remains to evaluate these two cases in the court of appeals by the
Syracuse Bank case decided in 1950 prior to the Gervant and Delmar Box
cases. That case was not cited in either of the later ones on the general
question now under consideration. It vas cited in another connection (only)
in the Delmar Box case.
The Syracuse Bank case is, however, significant on the issue at hand.
']'he questions presented in that case may be summarized as follows: (I)
whether or lot the Bank, as mortgagee, having a mortgage on the premises
of mortgagor was concluded under the standard policy and mortgagee clause
by an appraisal carried out under the standard appraisal provision by the
insured and insurer- (2) whether or not the insured was bound by the
appraisal award. The insured was held bound by the award over objections
[VOL. XII1
APPRAISALS OF LOSS AND DAMAGE
not pertinent to the question now at hand. The award at the same time was
held invalid as to the mortgagee for reasons immediately pertaining to the
issue at hand. According to the view of the majority the award was invalid
as to the mortgagee because, the standard mortgagee clause "necessarily
means that in event of loss he [the mortgagee] is entitled to notice and the
opportunity to participate in an appraisal, if he is to be bound thereby."
(Emphasis added). Again: "Certainly, then, if the mortgagee must be a
party to any settlement between the insured and the company and to any
judicial proceeding brought by the insured against the company, the mort-
gagee cannot be bound by an appraisal of which it had no notice and in
which it had no opportunity to participate." (Emphasis added.) And yet
again: .... It would be going pretty far to hold that the mortgagee has not
only no say in choosing the appraisers who are to hear and determine the
question of the amount to be paid him, but no right to attend the appraisal
proceedings and introduce evidence that will have a bearing upon that ques-
tion. Tne, the mortgagor may be intent on procuring the highest possible
award, and, it may be urged, he may be expected to present all available evi-
dence and in the best possible light," (Emphasis added.) but that may not,
the majority of the court thought, preclude the mortgagee from protecting
"the mortgagee's interest in the manner he deems most effective" or "from
participating in the proceeding which will actually decide the amount to be
paid to him," The dissenting opinion indicates that the majority and minor-
ity of the court understood precisely that the difference between theul
centered upon the right of hearing. The dissenting minority expressed the
difference as follows: "The sole question here is as to the alleged contractual
right of the mortgagee (plaintiff Syracuse Savings Bank) to have notice of,
and participate in, the appraisal procedure described in the policy as one of
the methods of establishing the amount of the loss." (The court supplied
the italics for "establishing"; the others are supplied by the present authors.)
The dissent continued: "Since the policy contains no language conferring
any such right on a mortgagcc, and indeed specifically confers such a right
on the owner above, I cannot find a basis for a holding that the mortgagee
has such a right none the less." (Emphasis added.)
Just how the views in the Syracuse Bank case are to be reconciled wvith
those voiced by the court of appeals in the Delmar Box case is not apparent.
One thing is certain, however, that the court of appeals has advanced
no justification for cutting down in any respect the right of hearing under the
standard appraisal provision from that right existing with respect to both
common law and statutory arbitrations in New York. An arbitrar' denial
of equal protection would seen manifest if it were to deny the right in any
particular to insured and insurer while according it to the mortgagee as the
court did in the Syracuse Bank case.
Conclusion: The court of appeals could do a genuine service to the law
of the New York standard appraisal provision and proceedings and awards
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thereuder if it wcre to cast aside the ancient abstractions and bald pro-
nounccmcnts upon the differences between arbitration and appraisal and
recognize the common (and identical) function of the two processes includ-
ing right of hearing therein. We believe that the text opinion of the Supreme
Court of Minnesota in American Ins. Co. v. District Ct.79 should prove
helpful to this end. In this case, decided in 1914, that court set out the
right of hearing in appraisals under the Minnesota standard appraisal pro-
vision as follows:
It has long been common for fire insurance policies to contain a
provision that the anin nt of loss shall be asccrtained by an
appraisement to be made as provided in the policy. Similar pro-
visions arc found in other forms of contract. Notwithstanding the
different wording of such agreements as found in different contracts,
the appraisements made thcrcundcr havc generally been considered
as ii the nature of common-law arbitrations, and as governed by
the rules applying to such arbitrations, except as otherwise expressly
provided. This state has always adopted that view of the law. The
rules governing arbitrations have been applied to proceedings for
determining the amount of loss under insurance policies, and for
making appraisements under other forms of contract, irrespective
of whether the persons determining such matters were designatedappraisers', 'referees', 'arbitrators', or otherwise. (Citation of cases
omitted.)
In several of the cases cited the persons selected by the parties to
determine the matter in dispute wvcrc designated as 'appraisers' and
the person selected by the appraisers to act with them was desig-
natal as 'umpire'. In this respect the terms used were the same as
in the case at bar, yet it has been uniformly held that such boards
whether appointcd as 'appraisers', 'referces', or 'arbitrators', must
afford the parties a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to pre-
sent their evidence, and that, although they may make a personal
examination of the premises and of the property under proper cir-
cumstances, the) cannot base their award upon their personal
knowledge to the exclusion of pertinent evidence offered by the
parties. (E, mphasis added.)
6. Recent Recommendations By the Law Revision Commission to the
Legislature To Amend New York Insurance Law.
It remains to refer to the most recent Recommendations of the Law
Revision Commission of Newv York to the legislature relating to the standard
appraisal provision.,"
'f'he Commission has reported that it "believes that the result of Mat-
ter of Delmar Box Co. is sound in policy, to the extent that it preserves the
79. 125 Minn. 37-, 174 NW. 242 (1914).
80. RECOMMENDATIONS TO TIlE L.G.ISiATURX RELATING 'o ENFORCEMENT OF
AcRFNm ENrs rOR APPRAISAl. OR VALUATION AND T1O ARBITRATION OF CI"'RTAIN NoxN-
JUSTFIABIE ISSUES. (Mimeographed)
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simple and informal device of a common-law third party determination and
the binding effect of such a dcetermination when made." (Elniphasis added.)
We find it truly puzzling to ascertain the basis for this belief, and even
more so, how, or to what extent, the decision or opinion rescues or "preserves"
the "simple and informal device" referred to. \Ve are not unmindful in this
connection of the Syracuse Bank and Gervnt cases last reviewed above.
The Commission has, however, recommended the amendment of sec-
tions 168 and 173 of the Insurance Law so as to add authority for court
appointment (i.e. by the judge) of an appraiser is either party fails to do so
as provided in the appraisal provision to the present authority to appoint an
"umpire" when the appraisers fail to agree."' This idea follows generally
the 1955 amendment of the Minnesota policy reviewed above. Any such
enforcement, however, would be left to the discretion of the judge as fol-
lows: "If the judge shall find that it would be inequitable to require appraisal
of the loss prior to the determination of other controversies between the
parties, lie may deny an application for the selection of an appraiser without
prejudice to a subsequent application."
One cannot quarrel too much with the Commission over the proposed
amendment; it would help to some extent to even up the rights of appraisal
as betwcen insured and insurer.
On the other band, it does not provide the appraisal board with power
to subpoiina witnesses or evidcnce as is provided under the arbitration
statute (N.Y. Civil Practice Act, section 1456). It does not clarify the
parties' right of hearing. It does not facilitate the procedure to confirn and
enter judgment upon the award or to vacate, modify or correct the award
by the motion practice set out in the arbitration statute. Plenary suits would
seem to be required instead.t 2
rrle vesting of the foregoing discretion in the judge to deny application
for the selection of an appraiser if it would lie incquitablc to require appraisal
"prior to the determination of other controversies between the parties," with-
out prejudice to a subsequent application, invites holding up appraisal until
"liability" is determined - presumably in some plenary action or proceeding
separate from that of the application. As we have indicated above under
the arbitration statute, the "liability" issues would be disposed of in the pro-
ceeding in which objection to the application is made.
Conclusion: We submit that there is no substantial reason - legal or
functional - why insurance appraisenient should not be reckoned under the
81. SEN. fNT. 1002; ASSEMBLY INT. 1454. We are advised that the bill passed the
Assembly but died in the Senate Insurance Committee.
82. Concededly, however, when summary judgment procedure is readily available,
the difference between the two processes of enforcement of the award are not so
serious. See Matter of Resolute Paper Prods. Corp., 160 Misc., 722, 290. N.Y. Supp. 87
(Sup. Ct. 1936).
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modern arbitration statutes. To do so would even up the rights of appraisal
to insured and insurer alike. Since the insured must for all practical purposes
take the policy and appraisal provision therein, it is difficult to justify the
present want of any practical enforcement in his behalf as compared with
the enforcement (irrevocability) made available for the insurer.
In view of the foregoing admonition of the court of appeals in the
Delnar Box case that any legislation to this end must be very clear and
concise, it occurs to us that the simplest process of amendment for this pur-
pose would be an addition to the text of the standard policy (i.e. the appraisal
provision [herein) of words to the effect that said provision and any pro-
ceedings and awards thereunder shall be subject to the arbitration statute
and the rights and remedies therein provided.
